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This study was designed to investigate the interrelation between cognition and affect in 
obsessive-compulsiveness/Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD). Based on established 
empirical evidence that hyperactive conflict-monitoring is highly correlated both with 
hyperactivity in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and with symptom severity in OCD 
- and therefore that overactive conflict-monitoring can be conceptualized as a possible 
mechanism of the disorder - it was hypothesized that hyperactivity of the 
PANIC/separation-distress emotion system in the brain (which is largely localized in the 
ACC) would co-vary with conflict-monitoring levels in people with tendencies towards 
OCD and thus could be considered the correlate of OCD in the affective sphere. Two 
questionnaires (the Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire and the Padua Inventory) were used 
to position a non-clinical, college sample of 1119 participants in terms of their tendency 
towards obsessive-compulsiveness. The top 21 and bottom 20 scorers were then tested to 
gauge their levels of cognitive conflict-monitoring and separation-distress. Independent 
t-test analysis revealed that the two groups differed significantly on scores of separation-
distress (as well as on the Affective Neuroscience Personality Scales subscales ANGER, 
FEAR and PLAY), whilst there was no significant difference in the group scores for 
conflict-monitoring. Correlational analyses revealed no significant relationships between 
any of the nine OCD questionnaire factors and conflict-monitoring; similar analyses 
emphasized differences found for separation-distress scores and provided further, detailed 
description of relationships between the OCD questionnaire factors and this affective 
aspect. Implications for neuropsychology are that separation-distress seems likely to be a 
pivotal emotion involved in OCD. 
Keywords: Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), sub-clinical/subsyndromic 












Chapter 1: Introduction 
Passion is a positive obsession. Obsession is a negative passion. 
- Paul Carvel, Belgian ~vriter 
Emotion and cognition are fundamental points of interest in the science of psychology. 
They have been continuous subjects of research since the beginnings of the discipline, 
and the subject of fascination and debate for centuries before. Whilst behavioural 
psychologists throughout the first half of the twentieth century dismissed both emotion 
and cognition as introspective and therefore immune to empirical investigation, the way 
these internal, intangible elements function and what they imply about the human mind 
remained at the fore of curiosity in psychology. Their integral role in the psychological 
life of humans could not be ignored. Human nature hungers for explanations regarding 
personality and behaviour, for the motivators behind our unique existences. Though the 
innate curiosity about emotion and cognition prevailed, science did not possess the 
requisite tools to study these reified concepts according to its own empirical rigours. It is 
only during the last few decades that science has begun to comprehend, clarify, and in 
many cases unveil startlingly counterintuitive discoveries about the complexities of the 
mind. 
It is in this spirit of new scientific possibility in the realms of emotion and cognition that 
the current piece of research was undertaken. Its conception was inspired by the 
neurobiological theories of emotion that are emerging and by modern neuroimaging 
techniques that are enabling such theories to evolve. One of the main reasons it is 
relevant to utilize these developing techniques to investigate affect and cognition, is that 
it may lead to far greater understanding in the realm of psychological pathology. Owing 
to the convergence of several fascinating neuropsychological findings regarding emotion 
and cognition in the neuropsychiatric pathology of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder 
(OCD), this condition will provide the focus for the current dissertation. OCD involves 
constant intrusion of highly unpleasant and negatively-charged emotional thoughts, ideas 











mental behaviours (compulsions). In the clutches of OeD, people are compelled to carry 
out specific acts to negate the emotional distress or dreaded outcome of their obsessions. 
Their compulsions persist, even though their behaviours are not realistically related to 
their fears, and - more intriguingly - even though they know this to be the case. 
Behaviours intended to ward off crippling anxiety, metamorphose into pathologically 
endless spirals of self-perpetuating stereotypies: the more someone with OeD gives in to 
his urge to check, for example, that his back door is locked before he goes to sleep, the 
more he will be compelled to repeat the action over and over again. The perpetual cycles 
of checking, doubting and cleaning that ensnare OeD sufferers is sharply 
counterintuitive: why should a repeated action not quell the urge to perform it, as it does 
in the non-OeD population? It is this fundamental dissonance between cause and effect -
and the related chasm between the rational and obsessed self within every OeD sufferer -
that has spurred decades of research into the disorder. The reality of oeD violates all 
intuitions regarding the nature of cognition, and leaves many unanswered questions in 
terms of the experience of emotion in the disorder. 
Why should the cognitive process of logical reasoning break down in OeD, rendering the 
patient victim to a merciless spiral of repetitive thought? And why should such intense 
anxiety about the fear or obsession persist unabated in the face of this same unassailable 
logic? It certainly appears as though there is far more at work beneath the surface in 
obsessive-compulsiveness than some small oddity in the cognitive process. The brain is 
equipped to deal with cognitive dissonance and it would seem that the incongruity 
encountered in OeD should be no exception - the violation of cognitive fluidity that 
arises as a result of an inner and outer state of affairs that are not reconciled should easily 
be dealt with by the gestalt rationality of the human mind. Why the brains of those with 
OeD should fail to correct and maintain cognitive harmony in this way is the subject of a 
vast body of empirical research stemming from a broad spectrum of psychological 
frameworks. Through neuroimaging techniques and related clinico-anatomical 
investigations of brain structure and function, it is becoming clear that specific brain 











implicated in OCD. The motivation for this dissertation is based on these findings, and on 
related cognitive and affective neuroscience research. 
Over the last few decades, neuropsychological research has suggested that obsessions and 
compulsions in OCD arise from the persistent sense that something is wrong in the 
immediate environment: chronic and maladaptive hyperactivation of the orbital frontal 
cortex (in which certain distributed pathways appear to be consistently implicated in error 
detection) seems largely involved in this intensely experienced, yet incorrect, perception 
(Schwartz & Begley, 2002). Such hyper-vigilance of environmental errors has been 
observed in other studies, in which brain areas that became activated during the 
resolution of cognitive conflict were investigated. Such studies pointed to what appeared 
to be the crucial involvement in cognitive conflict resolution of a brain region called the 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC); this strengthened the hypothesis that hyperactive error-
detection plays a central role in OCD, when it was discovered that those with the disorder 
reliably display heightened metabolic activity in the ACC (Baer, Wetter, Nichols, Greene 
& Berry, 1995; Breiter et aI., 1996; Breiter & Rauch, 1996; Gehring, Himle & Nisenson, 
2000; Schwartz, 1999; Schwartz & Begley, 2002; Schwartz, Stoessel, Baxter, Martin & 
Phelps, 1996; van Veen & Carter, 2002). 
The ACC is part of a theoretically grouped network of structures known as the limbic 
system, a diffuse 'structure' broadly conceptualized as being responsible for affective 
reactivity (Solms & Turnbull, 2002). The amygdala is considered a key aspect of the 
limbic system, and is largely instrumental in mediating the conscious and unconscious 
generation, experience and perception of fear and dread (Damasio, 1999; Kandel, 
Schwartz, & Jessell, 1991; Solms & Turnbull, 2002) - two emotions that feature 
prominently in the subjective experience of OCD. The amygdala projects into the 
striatum, one of the four basal ganglia nuclei, which has also been found to be overactive 
in the brains of those with OCD (Schwartz & Begley, 2002). The ACC is therefore 
anatomically interrelated with structures that generate some of the most commonly 
perceived emotions in the disorder. However, neurobiological and neuroimaging research 











basic-emotion command systems in the mammalian brain: the emotion known as PANIC 
or separation-distress (Panksepp, 1998). 
Additional reason to pursue a study relating the above elements comes from the 
psychoanalytical conception of the separation-distress emotion in obsessional neurosis 
(Bowlby, 1960; Fairbairn, 1952). As discussed in Chapter 2, it is clear that Freud 
conceptualized true obsessional neuroses as fundamentally affective or emotional in 
nature, as opposed to cognitive (Freud, 1924). Psychoanalytic approaches to the disorder, 
in line with phenomenological evidence, suggest that obsessive-compulsiveness involves 
an inability to 'let go', and that it revolves essentially around the issue of loss (Bowlby, 
1960; Fairbairn, 1952). Based on the convergence of these lines of evidence from 
disparate psychological standpoints, the rationale for this dissertation stems from the 
suggestion made by neuropsychological studies into hyperactivity of the ACe. Recent 
research suggests that the functioning of this brain structure in both normal and abnormal 
cognition might provide an invaluable lead to a better understanding of the workings of 
emotion in OCD, and also of how disturbances in basic, primitive emotion may develop 
into the cognitive malfunction characteristic of this mental illness. 
1.1. The research problem and objectives 
The overall aim of this study is to discover whether PANIC or separation-distress is 
heightened in participants who also show a heightened tendency towards obsessive-
compulsiveness. This research question will be addressed by measuring obsessive-
compulsiveness with two established questionnaires (The Meta-Cognitions 
Questionnaire; MCQ; Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997 and the Padua Inventory; PI; 
Sanavio, 1988) and statistically examining the relationship of the overall combined score 
obtained to scores on a measure of separation-distress (the PANIC subscale of the 
Affective Neuroscience Personality Scales; ANPS; Davis, Panksepp, & Normansell, 
2003). 
A related issue of interest - but one that cannot be directly addressed by the design of this 











more broadly, in obsessive-compulsive tendencies. The salience of fear-anxiety in the 
disorder is in no way refuted, but a consideration is that it may be a secondary emotion, 
closely related to separation-distress. In investigating the affective nature of OCD, the 
dissertation will attempt to address the hiatus between the cognitive and psychoanalytic 
literature on OCD; the former often neglects the role of emotion altogether, while the 
latter centres on emotion but neglects to delineate its involvement with techniques now 
available to neuropsychological science. When the various research findings discussed 
above are considered in the light of current knowledge regarding OCD as well as the 
modern understanding of emotion and cognition as deeply and hierarchically connected 
brain processes, it seems highly plausible that the disordering of cognition in OCD does 
in fact, as intimated by psychoanalysis, arise as a secondary manifestation of the disorder. 
Owing to the lead provided by ACC hyperactivity in both OCD patients and 10 
hyperactive cognitive conflict-monitoring, another necessary aim of the study is to 
investigate whether a significant increase in conflict- or error-monitoring (evaluated by a 
meta-cognitive Stroop task) IS significantly related to heightened obsessive-
compulsiveness, measured as described above. Establishing this would lead to the 
correlation of separation-distress and conflict-monitoring, in the context of OCD, 
providing the possibility that they could be conceptually positioned as emotional and 
cognitive manifestations of the disorder, respectively. It is hoped that the findings might 
contribute in a minor way towards a new, integrative approach to understanding mental 
experIence, one in which cognition and emotion are properly considered as deeply 
entrenched processes arising dependently out of the evolution of the brain, a 
neuroscientific account which is finally able to fit with the nature of holistic SUbjective 
experIence. 
This dissertation aIms to replicate evidence that supports conflict-monitoring as a 
possible mechanism of OCD, and to establish separation-distress as its covariant in the 
affective sphere. This will be done by investigating the association between performances 
on tests of conflict-monitoring and separation-distress and correlating these tendencies 










affective tests used in this dissertation could be extended to a neuroimaging paradigm, for 
inclusion in a neuroimaging study. The specific aims of such a study would depend 
largely on the results of this dissertation. 
1.2. Overview: Research design and methodology 
This dissertation documents an empirical study of the cognitive and hypothesized 
affective manifestations of OCD. Two established questionnaires were used to position 
an undergraduate college sample along a spectrum of obsessive-compulsiveness. Once 
their overall scores (an average of their scores on the two questionnaires) had been 
finalized, participants at the extreme high and low end of the spectrum were asked to 
participate in the second part of the research. This involved evaluation of their affective 
profiles (also by means of a questionnaire) and assessment of the extent to which they 
monitor cognitive conflict. The extent to which hyperactivity of cognitive conflict-
monitoring and the separation-distress emotion covaried with obsessive-compulsiveness 
(or specific elements of obsessive-compulsiveness) was analyzed in the hope of shedding 
new light on the affective processes underlying OCD. An empirical, positivist approach 
was therefore relied upon to investigate the research problem. 
1.3. Overview: Development of dissertation 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation will review the academic literature that informs the 
background to this research study. First, key concepts are defined and then a brief 
overview of the various approaches to OCD is given, to contextualize the disorder and 
document the theories that have contributed to its modern conceptualization. Thereafter, 
empirical research on the significant elements informing the research hypothesis is 
presented. This includes research identifying error-monitoring brain activity and the 
relation of its malfunction to obsessive-compulsive cognition; research on the ACC in 
terms of its role in cognitive conflict-monitoring, and its implication in OCD; 
neurobiological evidence for basic-emotion command systems in the mammalian brain, 
in particular, the PANIC or separation-distress emotion system and its relation to the 
ACe. The chapter will be concluded with an explanation of the convergence of this 











Chapter 3 describes the research design and methodology, givmg a full account of 
sampling procedures; issues of research design, measurement and ethics; and 
explanations regarding the chosen methods of data collection, capturing, editing and 
analysis. Chapter 4 presents the results obtained from the study. Finally, Chapter 5 entails 
a full discussion of the interpretation of the results; their theoretical and practical 
implications in terms of both previous research and the aims and hypotheses of this 
dissertation; and the limitations and recommendations for future research to be 











Chapter 2: Literature review 
Before reviewing the literature relevant to the research topic, it will be necessary to 
define the few key variables that will recur throughout this dissertation. In addition, at the 
beginning of the literature review, special attention will be given to a brief overview of 
the different approaches that have been taken towards OeD throughout its history as a 
psychological entity. 
2.1. Operationalization of key variables 
This section outlines the key concepts in the current research study, and defines them 
specifically for the purposes of this dissertation. Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) 
has already been discussed. However, it will be defined again here, so that it may be 
related to the other critical terms. OCD is a neuropsychiatric disorder characterized by 
two classes of symptoms: obsessions and compulsions; the former are continually 
recurring, unwanted thoughts that usually concern a specific feared circumstance, while 
the latter are repetitive, ritualistic behaviours carried out to reduce anxiety associated 
with the obsessions (American Psychiatric Association, 1994 in Gehring et al., 2000). 
The obsessions are experienced as highly distressing (Maltby, Tolin, Worhunsky, 
O'Keefe & Kiehl, 2004) and pervasive, especially in light of the ego-dystonic nature of 
the disorder - regardless of the intensity of an OeD urge to, for example, wash one's 
hands again, the sufferer knows rationally that his hands are not dirty and is able to reflect 
insightfully on the utter senselessness of the obsession (Schwartz & Begley, 2002), 
though the urge and its associated fear persist unabated. OeD is the fourth most common 
mental disorder; it has a six month prevalence of one to two percent (Myers et al., 1984 
in Maltby et al., 2004) and a lifetime prevalence of two to three percent (Robins et al., 
1984 in Maltby et al., 2004). 
Suh-clinical or Subsyndromic obsessive-compulsive disorder is the term given to a level 
of clinically significant symptoms, which do not cause enough distress or impairment to 
meet full diagnostic criteria for clinical OeD, as stipulated by the DSM-IV, which 
maintains that for an OeD diagnosis, symptoms must 1) cause marked distress, 2) 











relationships (Leckman & Cohen, 1999). This is an appropriate point to state the 
approach of the current dissertation to clinical diagnosis of OCD. It is clear from the 
empirical literature that there has been dissent over the classification of the disorder. 
Until quite recently, it was mostly maintained that the strict criteria outlined in the DSM-
IV should remain the diagnostic standard for OCD, which resulted in its being seen as a 
relatively rare disorder (Esman, 1989; Stein, 1996, both in Stein et a!., 1999). Based on 
evidence in the recent decades, however, that the disorder is mediated by specific 
neurochemical circuitry (Altemus et a!., 1994; Goodman et a!. 1990, both in Leckman & 
Cohen, 1999; Zohar & Insel, 1987a, 1987b) and that certain neuroanatomical systems 
play important roles in mediating its course (Baxter et a!., 1992; Insel, 1992; Wise & 
Rapoport, 1989; both in Leckman & Cohen, 1999), there has been a contemporary shift 
in the conceptualization of OCD from a strictly defined, rare phenomenon to a spectrum 
of disorders that vary in their symptom constellations and in their intensity and which are 
far more prevalent in the population than previously estimated (Karno et a!., 1988; 
Weissman et a!., 1994, both in Leckman & Cohen, 1999). 
The issue of precisely defining OCD should not be of critical concern in this dissertation, 
firstly because the research takes the contemporary approach of OCD existing as a 
spectrum of disordered thoughts, emotions and behaviours experienced at some level by 
everyone, secondly because a sub-clinical sample will be targeted, and thirdly because 
the topic is not directly a study into the disorder of OCD itself, but rather uses the 
disorder as a platform from which to investigate primitive, prototype emotions involved 
in obsessive-compulsive-type thought and behaviour (and the manner in which faulty 
cognition may arise from underlying emotional pathology). The research will focus on 
overactivity in two domains: error-monitoring and separation-distress. Error-monitoring 
has already been established as integral to the clinical picture of OCD, and any findings 
correlating it with separation-distress could strongly substantiate the argument that this 
particular emotion system is the one chiefly implicated in the clinical disorder of OCD. 
However, even resisting an extension of the findings to the criteria-fulfilling disorder 











any correlations discovered between obsessive-compulsiveness per se and both 
separation-distress and error-monitoring. And if the approach to the disorder suggested 
by modern neuroimaging is that OCD be viewed not so much as a distinct pathological 
process but more as a tendency towards certain neurochemical patterns (patterns that are 
observed prolifically and continuously in those diagnosed with OCD, but which also may 
be observed in the normal population in correspondence with certain cognitions and 
emotional experiences), the findings of this dissertation may be well positioned to draw at 
least limited and exploratory conclusions about the relationships amongst obsessive-
compulsiveness, separation-distress and conflict-monitoring. 
Conflict in this dissertation refers to the cognitive process in which the brain recognizes 
that the responses one is making are in some manner not synchronized with a desired 
state of affairs (Gehring et aI., 2000). In cognitive terms, this may be referred to as the 
presence of two incompatible streams of information processing (van Veen & Carter, 
2002). Recognition of cognitive conflict results in the generation of error-related 
negativity (ERN), which is a component of the event-related brain potential (ERBP) - a 
scalp-recorded measure that reflects through a series of voltage oscillations any neuronal 
activity associated with sensory, cognitive or motor events, with good temporal 
resolution but not as accurate spatial resolution (Hillyard & Anllo-Vento, 1998 in 
Langleben et aI., 2002; van Veen & Carter, 2002). The ERN begins at 50 to 150 
milliseconds after the moment of error in reaction time (RT) tasks (Gehring et aI., 2000; 
van Veen & Carter, 2002) and seems the best current technique for locating the actual 
moment of experienced cognitive conflict. 
The concept of conflict has often been confounded in the empirical literature with that of 
control (van Veen & Carter, 2002). However, recent studies have provided the means by 
which to distinguish clearly between them: by llsing fMRI scans to analyze ACC activity 
in relation to RTs on RT tasks, researchers have shown that a high degree of control is 
needed during consecutively incongruent trials, and that in this situation, conflict is low; 
conversely, when many consecutive congruent trials are suddenly followed by an 











Carter, & Cohen, 1999 in van Veen & Carter, 2002). This demonstrably dissociates the 
two concepts; although interrelated, they are clearly different - and even complementary 
- in nature. 
The terms error- and conflict-monitoring are used interchangeably in this dissertation. 
Most broadly, they are used to refer to the neurochemical and cognitive process of the 
recognition of conflict in the information-processing, cognitive sense. In other words, 
error- or conflict-monitoring is the process whereby discrepancies in cognitive input or in 
cognitive tasks are analyzed as a precursor to dealing with such conflict by making 
specific decisions in terms of perception, sensation, or cognition. The terms are easiest to 
illustrate by means of cognitive tasks that emanate from the interference paradigm, which 
have been used to separate the concepts of conflict and control: in one version of the 
Eriksen flanker task, for example, participants are instructed to respond to a target 
(usually an arrow) presented at the centre of their computer screen and to respond to the 
identity of the target by pressing one of two buttons (the left or the right arrow button, 
according to their perceived orientation of the arrow on screen), and they must identify 
the central target while attempting to ignore peripherally presented, distracter targets (van 
Veen & Carter, 2002). Since the trials are presented consecutively and fairly rapidly, 
errors will of course be expected to occur, owing to partial or incomplete stimulus 
analysis (van Veen & Carter, 2002). 
Event-Related Potential (ERP) studies have revealed that awareness of these kinds of 
impUlsive 'slips' follow the error commission almost immediately, as reflected by a large, 
negative deflection in the ERP that has been called Error-Related Negativity (ERN; van 
Veen & Carter, 2002). It is hypothesized that processing of the stimulus continues after 
error commission, and that the subsequent presence of both the correct and incorrect 
(executed) response in the person's mind generates the context of conflict, leading to the 
peak of ERN (van Veen & Carter, 2002), which therefore can be seen as a reflection of 
error-detection (Scheffers, Coles, Bernstein, Gehring & Donchin, 1996 in Gehring et aI., 
2000). Of course, this kind of conflict seems mechanistic and somewhat irrelevant when 











by an OCD patient when he knows he has turned off the stove and yet feels an 
excruciating mental urge to check it again. However, the foundational concept is the 
same: two competing streams of disparate information that cannot co-exist harmoniously 
and demand a decision regarding which will gain precedence. Various studies have 
demonstrated that neurons in the orb ito-frontal cortex, striatum and anterior cingulate 
cortex increase exponentially in their firing rate when a cognitive error is detected 
(Thorpe, Rolls & Maddison, 1983; van Veen & Carter, 2002), suggesting their possible 
participation in a distributed network of error-detection. The neurons return to a base rate 
of firing activity when internal expectations are once again synchronized with external 
circumstances (Schwartz & Begley, 2002). 
Emotion will be defined in its biological sense, and as distinct from 'feelings', according 
to a pioneer of the neurobiology of emotions, Antonio Damasio (1999). Emotions are 
complex, pattern-forming constellations of chemical and neural responses that serve their 
evolutionary purpose by fulfilling some regulatory function that is advantageous to the 
survival of the organism in which it manifests. At the most fundamental level, this means 
maintaining the vulnerable internal milieu of the organism within relatively narrow 
parameters - the process known as homeostasis. Emotions arise from biological 
templates in the mammalian brain, though they are open to modification by culture and 
the intervention of unique experiences in every organism's life. Set, subcortical brain 
regions are responsible for the generation of emotions, and are automatically activated 
without the need for consciousness; in this sense, emotions are largely stereotyped. 
Emotions are manifested in both the body (in terms of visceral, musculoskeletal and 
vestibular systems) and the brain: they create vast changes in brain circuitry that lead to 
the generation of consciously felt feelings. 
Separation-distress is the feeling associated with the PANIC basic-emotion neural system 
ingrained in the mammalian brain (Panksepp, 1998). When removed from its social 
support system, an organism's PANIC emotion system is activated to increase its chances 
of survival, by generating the instinct to engage in distress vocalizations (DVs) - some 











followed by a withdrawal that has been likened to depression, in which DVs are 
discontinued as a way to remain hidden from predators and to shift the responsibility for 
the search to the caregiver (Panksepp, 1998). 
2.2. The empirical literature 
Many theoretical frameworks, arising from all regions of the psychological landscape, 
have been put forward to account for OCD. Freud distinguished obsessions from phobias 
by the relationship between cognition and emotion in each of these neuroses: he certified 
'true obsessions' as those in which the emotional state is the main feature of the neurosis 
(Freud, 1924). In an obsession, the emotional state persists unaltered, whereas the 
cognitions associated with it often vary (Freud, 1924). By contrast, the emotional state of 
"morbid anxiety" that dominates phobic neuroses (Freud, 1924, p. 129) may be present or 
absent according to the varying salience of the object or situation that provokes a phobia. 
In other words, it is the cognitive appraisal of the phobic object that evokes anxiety in 
phobias, whereas it is the constant emotional state that exists first in obsessive neuroses, 
and that leads to the development of cognitive rationalizations as attempts at neutralizing 
the distressing emotion. Freud provides as an example, people who have doubting 
obsessions. Such sufferers may have many doubts at the same time or constantly varying 
doubts that follow one another, but their central emotional state - doubt - remains the 
same (Freud, 1924). 
It is evident that very early on Freud intimated the primacy of emotion in obsessive 
disorders. Contrary to the cognitive and behavioural approaches to OCD that dominated 
the second half of the twentieth century (discussed below), he recognized that the ideas or 
cognitions associated with obsessions rather represent a secondary problem in the 
disorder. He reasoned that the obsessive process, whereby "absurd or quite harmless 
ideas stand out in the foreground of consciousness and resist dislodgement by logic, even 
proving completely refractory to it" (Hitschmann, 1921, p. 165), results from the false 
nature of the mental obsessions: they are only covers for emotions which have been long 
disconnected from the obsessions in a chain of cognitive replacements. From this 











rationally, because the real connection of the powerful affect and the substituted idea is 
lost, until perhaps uncovered through extensive psycho-analytical investigation. Here, 
Freud's conceptualization of obsessive disorders again coalesces with the converging 
evidence from contemporary research into OCD - as well as with subjective experiences 
reported by patients - in terms of the struggle to understand the circumlocutory nature of 
obsessions (and their related compulsions) and their frustrating, impenetrable resistance 
to logic. 
Freud made sense of the startling incongruity between the specific cognitions and the 
apparently drastic and over-reactive emotional states they invoke in obsessive patients as 
follows: based on extensive clinical investigations, he claimed that the emotion exhibited 
by patients with obsessive disorder is always justified, and that its apparent incongruity 
stems from the fact that "the associated idea is no longer the appropriate original one, 
aetiologically related to the original obsession, but is one which replaces it, a substitute 
for it" (Freud, 1924, p. 129). Freud maintained that the replaced ideas are always related 
to past sexual experiences that the patient is desperate to forget and that the substitution is 
made possible by the patient possessing a certain kind of "mental disposition" (Freud, 
1924, p. 129). However, in terms of a contemporary neuropsychological understanding of 
the relationship between emotion and cognition, the psychoanalytic description of 
obsession seems accurate and adequate in a self-contained manner: vast undercurrents of 
disturbed emotion lead to the development of strictly controlled cognitive 
rationalizations, in an effort to contain and repress an affective turmoil that would 
threaten the integrity of the self were it allowed to surface. 
Behavioural schools of thought viewed OCD as a simple matter of operant conditioning. 
The fact that individuals are subjectively rewarded for their compulsions, by an 
immediate and intense drop in otherwise disabling anxiety, explains why they continue to 
execute such actions and why the behaviours are prone to increase exponentially. One of 
the most rigorous therapies to arise from the behaviourist school of psychological thought 
was Exposure and Response Prevention (ERP): patients were literally forced to confront 











to the point of physical restraint, where necessary - from carrymg out their copmg, 
obsessive-compulsive response (Schwartz & Begley, 2002). Proponents of the therapy 
lauded its merit by claiming a success rate of 60 to 70 percent, but it was later discovered 
that this figure excluded the 20 to 30 percent of OCD patients who refused to take part 
when they learned what the procedure actually involved, as well as the 20 percent who 
dropped out, horrified by the experience to which they had been subjected (Schwartz & 
Begley, 2002). 
The largely unsuccessful application of this treatment to OCD can be accounted for partly 
by Freud's theoretical approach discussed above, in that strict behavioural therapy 
neglects to recognize the underlying, uniquely human and individual conflicting emotions 
that manifest as the disorder (Schwartz & Begley, 2002). Cognitive-behavioural research 
and practice has focused on combining a milder behavioural approach with cognitive re-
evaluation in order to eradicate obsessive-compulsive thinking and behaviour from 
patients' repertoires by encouraging them to reconstruct their reward-stimulus 
contingencies. Although the general principles of conditioning prevail, this technique 
relies rather on gentle, cognitive coaxing away from thought patterns in which 
performing the compulsive behaviour is considered a realistic cause for relief, towards 
systems of reward in which resisting the compulsion becomes cause for cognitive reward 
in terms of anxiety relief. 
The overwhelming majority of the empirical literature available on OCD consists of 
research emanating from the cognitive theoretical framework, which focuses on faulty 
thought patterns and other errors in cognitive and sensory processing that lead to the 
trademark slavish repetition of stereotyped behaviours in the disorder. Conceptualizing 
OCD from within a cognitive framework can have good explanatory power. For example, 
research has shown that the more times people with OCD carry out a compulsive act, the 
more they multiply visual memories of the act in their minds and the Jess able they are to 
distinguish amongst its many, almost identical, visual representations (van den Hout & 
Kindt, 2003). In other words, patients keep checking (for example) because the grossly 











confidence in their memories, by making the checking situation more and more familiar 
every time they go through it and thus decreasing how vivid and detailed their memories 
are, two factors crucial to memory confidence (van den Hout & Kindt, 2003). Thus -
counter to intuition - they become less sure about the reality of having executed an act 
and it becomes increasingly impossible to be absolutely certain that they actually have 
just performed the behaviour. This logic rests upon considering oeD from a vi suo-
perceptual, memory function and cognitive confidence point of view, which although 
contributing significantly to the understanding of faulty thinking in the disorder, falls far 
short of uncovering anything of its origins. 
Even with advances in neuroimaging, the cognitive approach has remained more or less 
unitary in terms of its insistence on cognition - often conceptualized as independent from 
emotion - as the underlying cause of OeD. Evidence of brain areas and circuitry 
involved in OeD can strengthen the cognitive account of the disorder in the absence of 
any reference to emotion, depriving emotion of its instrumental place in the development 
of the disorder. Neuroimaging research has consistently demonstrated basal ganglia 
dysfunction as important in the pathophysiology of oeD (Baxter et aI., 1992, Breiter et 
aI., 1996, Luxenberg et aI., 1988, Rauch et aI., 1994, Robinson et aI., 1995). The basal 
ganglia consist of four principal nuclei: the striatum (which consists of various structures: 
caudate nucleus, putamen and ventral striatum, including nucleus accumbens), the globus 
pallidus/pallidum, the substantia nigra (including pars reticulata and pars compacta), and 
the subthalamic nucleus (Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessell, 1991). 
Various neural circuits link the thalamus and the cerebral cortex, with the basal ganglia 
forming the major subcortical components thereof; through these connections, the basal 
ganglia contribute not only to voluntary movement (as was assumed early on in research 
of this area), but also to skeletomotor, oculomotor, cognitive and emotional functions 
(Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessell, 1991). It has become evident that these basal ganglia-
thalamocortical circuits are segregated, with integration of functions occurring within as 
opposed to between the delineated circuits (Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessell, 1991). Frontal 











and ending in specific frontal lobe regions, dependent on the thalamic feedback generated 
by the specific circuit: the limbic basal ganglia-thalamocortical circuit appears to begin 
and end in the anterior cingulate area and the medial orbitofrontal cortex (Kandel, 
Schwartz, & Jessell, 1991). The medial-ventral parts of the head of the caudate nucleus, 
as well as the nucleus accumbens (both striatal structures of the basal ganglia) appear to 
receive the most input from orbitofrontal and cingulate cortex regions; these are the basal 
ganglia structures most highly activated in OCD (e.g., Maltby et aI., 2004; Whiteside, 
Port, & Abramowitz, 2004). 
Subsystems of the caudate nucleus receive input from motor areas of the frontal lobe 
(e.g., the frontal eye fields, lateral orbital, supplementary motor and premotor areas) and 
from visuoperceptual areas of the parietal lobe (Alexander et aI., 1986; Gillman, Dauth, 
Frey & Penny, 1987). Thus various areas of the caudate control motor- and perceptual-
processing that contributes to visuomotor integration, consistent with the findings that 
those with OCD display deficits in visuomotor integration (Behar et aI., 1984; Boone, 
Ananth, Philpott, Kaur & Djenderedjian, 1991; Hollander et aI., 1990; Hollander et aI., 
1993). Some research has also found mild dysexecutive deficits in OCD, such as 
difficulties with cognitive set-shifting and obsessional slowness (Hymas, Lees, Bolton, 
Epps & Head, 1991) and problems with occulomotor inhibition (Rosenberg, Dick, 
Ohearn & Sweeney, 1997). 
It is important to consider properly the complex structure and function of the basal 
ganglia, as this has a significant bearing on the interpretation of brain activity resonant 
with obsessive-compulsive emotion and thought. The basal ganglia may be accurately 
conceptualized as a network that functions to recruit neural pathways in a habit-forming 
manner, as well as working to inhibit complex behavioural sequences - the work of 
researchers such as Cromwell and Berridge (1997) has shown how striatopallidal lesions 
can result in disinhibition of such habit-based behavioural sequences, for example, 
disinhibition of paw treading in rats, an animal model that bears closely on hyperkinetic 
movement in human diseases of the basal ganglia (such as chorea in Huntington's disease 











basal ganglia in consolidating behaviour sequences makes clear that a pathological 
consequence of these otherwise sophisticated adaptive mechanisms would be consistent 
with the presentation of oeD. 
However, the complexities of basal ganglia function and connectivity, and its possible 
role in the co-dependent generation of the emotional and cognitive phenomenology of 
obsessive-compulsive symptoms, is notably absent from the literature. More often, a 
cognitive model of oeD will focus on the mechanics of how visual and motor 
perceptions are integrated or which psychometric tests demonstrate sub-normal set-
shifting and processing speed performance in OeD patients, illustrating how the 
cognitive approach is typically devoid of reference to emotion. The fact that faulty 
cognitive set-shifting, processing speed and visuomotor integration, for example, could 
represent the adverse effects of a primary, underlying affective disturbance, is not even 
considered, and such elements are seen rather as straightforward contributors to OeD. 
This approach needs to be challenged. Freud's psychoanalytic theories not only 
incorporate, but are founded upon, human emotion. Neuropsychological techniques (such 
as neuroimaging) as well as theoretical development in neuropsychology, particularly 
regarding emotion (from neurobiology of emotion pioneers such as Damasio and 
Panksepp), could now allow a fusion of Freudian and contemporary neuroscIence 
theories that would advance the neuropsychology of emotion, both in OeD and in 
general. 
More comprehensive, holistic theories of OeD, ones that focus on the primacy of affect 
in the disorder, now need - and are finally able - to be explored. It is testament to the 
sheer complexity of the disorder that, although all the theories discussed above contribute 
to a keener understanding of OeD, none of them successfully encapsulates it in its 
entirety. It remains for all available evidence regarding the mental illness of OeD to he 
unified by a strong basic framework. The most contemporary research approach -
neuroimaging - seems to offer a window into the disorder and a framework for its 
explanation that may elucidate the common and valid contributions of each of the 











new research directions. It is hoped that this dissertation contributes to the beginnings of 
a unification of thought, practice and research regarding emotion and cognition on the 
topics of both OCD and (more broadly) on the neuropsychology of emotion. 
As intimated, OCD is represented in the empirical literature by a vast body of research. 
Its focus was predominantly cognitive until recent decades, when technological advances 
meant that functional and structural imaging studies began to facilitate immense progress 
in the field. Originally, Positron Emission Tomography (PET) scans began to make it 
possible to study the structure of the brains of OCD patients and to compare them with 
those of matched controls without the disorder. One of the earliest of these studies, an 
analysis of the PET scans of 24 OCD patients, suggested that three main brain structures 
were consistently implicated in the disorder: the orbital frontal cortex, the caudate 
nucleus and the anterior cingulate gyrus all demonstrated "hypermetabolic activity" in the 
brains of those with OCD (Baxter et aI., 1988 in Schwartz & Begley, 2002, p. 62). As 
scanning and imaging techniques became more refined, functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (fMRI) combined with ERBP measures, and Single Positron Emission 
Computerized Tomography (SPECT), proved the most illuminating and thus widely used 
imaging procedures for the study of OCD. 
Using these research tools, the particular patterns of discordant neural activity that 
appeared closely related to the disorder was further revealed. Convergence of findings 
regarding functional hyperactivity in OCD is evident in the recent literature, as 
demonstrated by the overlap in brain regions concluded by various researchers to be 
implicated in the disorder: the orbitofrontal-striatal circuit (Stein et aI., 1999); cortical-
striatal-thalamic-cortical circuit (Gehring et aI., 2000); frontal-striatal circuits, especially 
including the orbitofrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, thalamus and caudate 
(Maltby et aI., 2004); the fronto-subcortical circuit, involving the orbitofrontal and 
cingulate cortex, the ventromedial striatum, the globus pallidus/substantia nigra pars 
reticulata complex, the thalamus and its connections with the cortex (Bucci et aI., 2004); 
and significant, consistent hyperactivity in the orbital gyrus and the head of the caudate 











scanmng studies of OCD (Whiteside, Port & Abramowitz, 2004). Although 
inconsistencies in imaging study results exists, it has been empirically established 
through the brain imaging research paradigm that hypermetabolic activity in the 
orbitofrontal cortex - with particular involvement of the anterior cingulate cortical region 
and the caudate nucleus - is strongly implicated in OCD. 
2.3. Heterogeneity of OeD 
As with all clinical syndromes, OCD is vastly heterogeneous in its clinical presentation. 
This has led some researchers to view its variants as a spectrum of disorders rather than 
one single category of mental illness (Stein, 2000). It is argued that it may even be 
necessary to delineate various types of OCD spectrums, so varied and often irreconcilable 
are the data on the illness from the fields of neurochemistry, neuroanatomy, genetics, 
neuroimmunology and animal models (Stein et aI., 1999). The established heterogeneity 
of OCD is important in its implications for the present dissertation, in that it must alert 
the researcher to the fact that tendencies towards obsessive-compulsiveness on the part of 
participants may correlate most strongly with one or more sub-categories within OCD, 
which are investigated as a group of similar (but not standard) indicative factors in the 
various OCD questionnaires. In the two questionnaires that will be used for data 
collection in this dissertation, the sub-categories considered indicators of OCD are as 
follows. First, in the Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire, there are five factors on which 
obsessive-compulsive tendency converges: positive beliefs about worry, negative beliefs 
about the uncontrollability of thoughts and corresponding danger, lack of cognitive 
confidence, negative beliefs about thoughts in general (including themes of superstition, 
punishment and responsibility), and cognitive self-consciousness (Cartwright-Hatton & 
Wells, 1998). Second, in the Padua Inventory, there are four factors: impaired control of 
mental activities, becoming contaminated, checking behaviours, and urges and worries of 
losing control over motor behaviours (Sanavio, 1988). 
2.4. The anterior cingulate cortex and conflict-monitoring 
The rationale for this dissertation stems from a specific focus on one of the brain regions 











cingulate cortex (ACC). The ACC has attracted a good deal of research attention, 
beginning with the finding that it appeared to control the selection of actions and the 
focusing of attention (Bush et aI., 1998; Posner & Dehaene, 1994). fMRI studies of the 
ACC, however, have since revealed its crucial involvement in emotional tasks with 
cognitive demand (Phan, Wager, Taylor & Liberzon, 2002), and it is this function of the 
ACC that is of core relevance in this study. It has been found that the ACC is particularly 
involved in the cognitive task of conflict detection: van Veen and Carter (2002) 
distinguished control from conflict by pairing congruent and incongruent interference 
task trials (e.g., Stroop test and Eriksen flanker interference paradigm). The ACC was 
most strongly activated when an incongruent trial followed congruent trials, that is, when 
control was lowest (resulting in longer reaction times) and conflict was highest. 
In line with this research, ERP studies (Reason, 1990 in van Veen & Carter, 2002) reveal 
that people often make fast, impulsive errors when subjected to conflict (as in the 
interference paradigms) and that their error is followed 50-150 milliseconds later with a 
large, negative deflection. This has been termed error-related negativity (ERN), and has 
been demonstrated to coincide with heightened ACC activity (Carter, Braver, Barch, 
Botvinick & Noll, 1998; Kiehl, Liddle & Hopfinger, 2000, both in van Veen & Carter, 
2002). The ACC is thus implicated in error-related activity (Menon, AdIeman, White, 
Glover & Reiss, 2001). Furthermore, research shows that the more certain subjects are 
that they have made a mistake, the more ERN is enhanced; this suggests that motivational 
factors are largely implicated in the monitoring of responses in the context of conflict, 
reflected in heightened ACC activity (Gehring et aI., 1993 Falkenstein et aI., 2000, both 
in Hajcak, McDonald & Simons, 2004; Johannes et aI., 2001). 
OCD patients reliably show increased activity in the ACC: during rest, during symptom 
provocation and after making errors on cognitive tasks (Gehring et aI., 2000; Ursu, Jones, 
Shear, Stenger & Carter, 2003). The following evidence suggests that the ACC is 
specifically involved in OCD: first, patients show increased ACC activity on both correct 
and incorrect high-conflict trials, though they have similar reaction times and make a 











et aI., 2000; Fitzgerald et aI., 2005); therefore people with OCD are unusually sensitive to 
conflicts, and researchers have suggested that such hyperactive error-detection may cause 
continuous preoccupation with correcting perceived - though more often than not, non-
existent - mistakes (Pitman, 1987; Schwartz et aI., 1996). Gehring et al. (2000) found 
that: 1) ERN was enhanced in OCD individuals (confirming previous research), and also 
that 2) the magnitude of this enhancement correlated with symptom severity, a second 
strong line of evidence in favour of the implication of an overactivated ACC in OCD. 
This study also found, however, that although people with OCD showed "heightened and 
prolonged e1ectrophysiological response to errors" (Gehring et aI., 2000, p. 5) they did 
not show a significant group difference to healthy controls in ERN activity on correct, 
high-conflict trials. 
Other studies (e.g., van Veen & Carter, 2002) have shown such significant differences. 
These conflicting results are perhaps inevitable as a result of small sample sizes and the 
heterogeneity of OCD as a syndrome, but Gehring et al. suggest another reason for the 
result. They note that the simple yes/no response paradigm that operates in something as 
straightforward as the Stroop task (used in this study) or similar laboratory interference 
tasks will not necessarily induce the effect of 'comparator dysfunction', that is, 
dissonance between internal reference points and a desired state of affairs, that is crucial 
to OCD. They note that, realistically, OCD involves a focus on symptom-relevant events 
(e.g., related to checking, cleaning one's hands, counting objects), and therefore that 
future research should study symptom-relevant events in relation to ACC hyperactivity. 
Maltby et al. (2004) found that only correctly-rejected, high-conflict trials produced 
unusually high ACC activation, and suggest therefore that correctly-rejected, high-
conflict trials that involve response inhibition could provide a better conceptualization of 
compulsions in OCD. Although there is some inconsistency of results, recent literature 
suggests that the ACC is gaining credence as a key structure in conflict detection. 
Further evidence for the role of an overactivated ACC in OCD comes from the 
comparison to the quality of ACC dysfunction in other neuropsychiatric and cognitive 











Mintun, Nichols & Cohen, 1997; Carter, MacDonald, Ross & Stenger, 2001, both in van 
Veen & Carter, 2002) and in Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD; Bush et 
aI., 1999). The major implication of an underactive error-monitoring network for 
schizophrenia is that post-error adjustments are made less effectively (van Veen & 
Carter, 2002); for ADHD, it could mean that underactive error-monitoring is the result or 
the cause of defective attentional control. Again, it is established in the literature that an 
overactive ACC is indicative of hyperactive conflict-monitoring: cognitive tests done 
during neuroimaging have established that OCD patients have heightened activity in the 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), which correlates with hyperactive conflict-monitoring. 
However, it is unreasonable to conceptualize OCD as a purely cognitive disorder. It is 
equally - if not primarily - an affective disorder. The affective aspect of OCD has been 
explored in the psychoanalytic literature, in which 'obsessional neurosis' is 
conceptualized as a pathological distortion of separation and loss mechanisms: patients 
deal with relentless, ambiguous feelings of fear that they might lose or harm their love 
object. 
2.5. The anterior cingulate cortex and separation-distress in OeD 
The cognitive evidence discussed above neglects the role of emotion in OCD. As stated 
before, it is unreasonable to consider that OCD has cognitive but not affective aspects - it 
is, by its very nature, an affective disorder. Four of the main "basic command systems for 
emotionality" (Panksepp, 1998) in the mammalian brain are as follows: SEEKING, 
which controls appetitive, goal-directed behaviours; RAGE, which mediates anger; 
FEAR, which controls responses that reduce an organism's risk to bodily harm; and 
PANIC, which mediates social emotional attachment processes and arouses a sense of 
loss and sorrow when an organism is separated from its social support system (Panksepp, 
1998). It is hypothesized in this study that PANIC is the underlying emotion in OCD, for 
the following reasons. First, PANIC is the only basic-emotion system in which the ACC 
is implicated, suggesting crucial involvement of this system in OCD because of the 
evidence relating heightened ACC activity, hyperactive conflict-monitoring and OCD. 
Second, both panic disorders and OCD respond to Selective Serotonin Reuptake 











which target the FEAR/ANXIETY system (Panksepp, 1998; Solms & Turnbull, 2002). 
Third, psychoanalytic and phenomenological evidence suggest that the separation-
distress/PANIC system is crucially implicated in OCD. 
2.5.1. The ACC in the PANIC emotion system 
Anatomically, the capacity to experience separation-distress seems to have emerged from 
the evolution of the more basic pain systems in the brain; specifically, the PANIC system 
arises largely from a variety of associated networks, which include the midbrain 
periaqueductal grey (P AG); the medial diencephalon (especially the dorsomedial 
thalamus); the ventral septal area, the preoptic area and numerous areas in the bed 
nucleus of the stria terminalis; and the ACC in some higher species (Panksepp, 1998). 
The implication that the ACC is an important part of the extended network that mediates 
separation-distress is intriguing, as research shows that it is also recruited during 
overactive conflict-monitoring (as demonstrated by imaging studies of OCD patients 
dealing with incongruent cognitive trials; e.g., van Veen & Carter, 2002). Additionally, 
there is some evidence that the ACC (specifically its dorsal subdivision: dACC) is crucial 
to experiencing the distressing nature of pain; it is reported that chronic pain patients who 
have their dACC lesioned, are no longer bothered by pain, although they can still detect it 
on a sensory level (Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004). 
Similarly, the significance of social pain is mediated by the dACC and ablation thereof in 
various animal species eliminates distress vocalizations on separation from caregivers 
(Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004). Such research supports the hypothesis that the brain 
bases of social and physical pain are similar (Eisenberger, Lieberman & Williams, 2003). 
However, it does also need to be noted that at this point in the development of the 
neurosciences, it is highly unlikely that clear dissociations between brain regions 
according to function can be made. In the case of the ACC, although imaging studies 
point to its unequivocal function in the genesis and experience of pain and emotion, they 
fail truly to show dissociable activation and deactivation patterns consistent with any 
particular emotion. Although the dACC appears to contribute to the affective experience 











1997 in Mullins, Rowland, lung, & Sibbitt, 2005), it may well be part of an extended 
network - comprising mUltiple limbic, paralimbic and brainstem areas - that does so, 
similar to the apparent multi-level functioning characteristic of all brain activity. 
However, the fact that ACC activation is associated with the affects of pain and sadness, 
as well as with a tendency to hyper-monitor conflict, is encouraging for the hypotheses of 
this study. 
Considering the tentative evidence discussed above, regarding damage to certain areas of 
the ACC resulting in a diminution of the emotional significance of pain to a person, a 
possible implication for OCD would be a reverse trend, that is, a vast overestimation of 
the emotional importance of social pain: since the ACC is hyperactive, it is plausible that 
this could contribute towards the immense difficulty patients have letting go of what 
makes them feel safe (that is, their obsessive thoughts and the compulsions that 
supposedly negate them). Eisenberger and Lieberman (2004) propose the ACC as a 
"neural alarm system" that both detects discrepancies, and signals a warning about the 
error. Panksepp (1998) advocates a similar concept, suggesting that perhaps shared neural 
components of the panic and anxiety systems constitute a "hypersensitized 'alarm' 
system." Neuroanatomically, the FEAR basic-emotion command system extends from 
the central and lateral areas of the amygdala in the temporal lobe to the anterior and 
medial hypothalamus, and then to the lower brainstem, which mediates typical autonomic 
fear-related responses (Panksepp, 1998). 
2.5.2. Effect of medication on PANIC system 
Although separation-distress and fear arise largely from complex and as yet incompletely 
understood neural processes, which no doubt share much overlap, it may nevertheless be 
possible to notice some neurochemical distinctions between the brain systems responsible 
for their production. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that, while multiple, interrelated 
systems (both neurochemical and neuroanatomical, as discussed above) are active in the 
generation of the emotions, it may be possible and also useful, from a research 
perspective, to note that the specific emotion systems perhaps rely more heavily on 











mediation. First, anticipatory anxiety is apparently chiefly generated by the FEAR neural 
system, while panic attacks arise from the PANIC neural system (Panksepp, 1998). 
Whereas opiates can be instrumental in decreasing separation-distress, research has 
shown that they may fail to diminish fearful behaviours; likewise, benzodiazepines have 
led to significantly decreased fear responses whilst remaining ineffectual in reducing 
separation-distress (Panksepp, 1998). 
Similarly, research has suggested that panic attack frequency is decreased by imipramine 
but that the attendant anticipatory anxiety has to be treated with benzodiazepines, in order 
to produce a complete subjective sense of improvement in panic attack patients. Thus the 
fear and panic systems perhaps merit a dissociable approach, if only to enable research 
progress, and as long as the basic principle of interconnectivity and multiple-system brain 
function is remembered. OCD has long been classified as an anxiety disorder (DSM-III-
R, 1987), and it therefore makes intuitive sense that the FEAR/anxiety system be 
implicated in this neuropsychiatric disorder: this is the emotion that drives obsessions and 
compulsions, from a phenomenological point of view. However, the fact that both panic 
attack frequency and OCD are decreased by the same medication provides good evidence 
for the intuition that panic is crucially implicated in obsessive-compulsiveness. 
2.5.3. Psychoanalytical and phenomenological evidence 
Cognitive models have hypothesized that the slavish repetition of compulsions or rituals 
in OCD is the result of negative reinforcement: the tendency to execute compulsions is 
strengthened exponentially by their ability to remove the intense anxiety that attends 
intrusive emotions in OCD. This may be the role that FEAR plays in OCD, but it is also 
phenomenologically clear that PANIC is implicated. People with OCD exhibit fear of 
detachment from objects, people or ideas that make them feel safe. They must have 
things 'just so', or they panic. The fact that the panic system involves feelings of loss also 
recommends it to OCD, since panic at the prospect of letting go of or losing a love object 












As discussed, the fact that the neural networks of the separation-distress and fear systems 
may be dissociated does not discount their probable interaction, probably especially in 
lower areas such as the mesencephalic PAG (Panksepp, 1998). This overlap may be 
illustrated on a phenomenological level with evidence from introspective experience: for 
example, we often feel anxiety in anticipation of situations that will provoke in us intense 
feelings of separation-distress, as in children who experience anxiety at the prospect of 
leaving their parents to attend school for the first time (Panksepp, 1998). This fits well 
with the intuition that relates separation-distress to OCD, as people with OCD are beset 
with immense anxiety at the prospect of not being able to check a door, for example - in 
other words, at the thought that they will be separated from interacting with the object or 
from carrying out the process that makes them feel safe. 
Therefore separation-distress can apparently generate activity In FEAR circuits, but 
behavioural data suggests that the converse is not true: animals exhibit specific fear 
responses (such as freezing and fleeing) that explicitly omit the distress vocalizations 
characteristic of separation-distress, as these would make them more vulnerable to 
predators (Panksepp, 1998). Similarly, humans who are frightened do not typically cry in 
response; rather, they perform actions likely to help them evade danger. Autonomically, 
fearful anxiety evokes responses of sweating, gastrointestinal symptoms, tachycardia and 
elevated muscular tension, whereas separation distress (especially in its most intense 
form, grief) manifests autonomically in parasympathetic symptoms such as chest 
tightness, the feeling of having a lump in the throat and a strong urge to cry (Panksepp, 
1998). This symptomatic distinction between fear and panic - the former dominated by a 
generalized apprehensive tension; the latter by feelings of depression and weakness -
further dissociates the two emotion command systems. Thus PANIC has still to be 
investigated as the emotion possibly most directly associated with OCD. 
2.5.4. Conclusion 
Panksepp proposes that the emotional distress of major psychiatric disorders is probably 
more closely linked to the changing dynamics of the underlying emotional systems than 











that the role of the separation-distress system in "the creation of affective turmoil is not 
yet wel1 recognized" (1998, p. 278). This provides further reason to hypothesize, as this 
dissertation does, that separation-distress is the affective covariant of overactive conflict-
monitoring in OCD, based on the evidence that both centre on overactivity of the ACC. 
2.6. Other emotions in OeD 
The second part of the study will involve assessing the two groups of participants (those 
towards the high and low ends of the O-C tendency spectrum) with the Affective 
Neuroscience Personality Scales (ANPS; Davis, Panksepp, & Normansel1, 2003). The 
primary purpose of this assessment is to gauge their scores on the SADNESS component 
of the scale, which provides the measure for the PANIC emotion system (Davis, 
Panksepp, & Normansel1, 2003). However, data that assesses al1 three other emotion 
systems in each participant will also necessarily be col1ected during the administration of 
this questionnaire, and may prove far from incidental. Close attention wil1 be paid to -
and analyses carried out on - the scores participants attain for the other six subscales of 
the ANPS (ANGER, CARE, FEAR, PLAY, SPIRITUALITY, and SEEKING) that 
col1ectively represent the other three main emotion systems of the mammalian brain: 
ANGER/RAGE, FEAR/ANXIETY, and SEEKING (Davis, Panksepp, & Normansel1, 
2003). It may be that one or more of these subscale measures correlate highly with O-C 
tendency, in which case, the link wil1 be further explored in relation to the other results. 
In fact, it is expected that there will be a close connection between the subscales that 
gauge ANXIETY and O-C tendencies, owing to the fact that anxiety is the chief emotion 
subjectively experienced in OCD and reported by sufferers of this disorder. As discussed 
in an earlier section (2.5.3.), however, this is hypothesized to be the result of an 
interaction between the emotions of separation-distress and anxiety, whereby anticipatory 












Chapter 3: Research design and methodology 
3.1. Research hypotheses 
This study was approached methodologically according to the three key research 
hypotheses that evolved throughout the conceptualization and literature review. They are 
as follows: 
Hypothesis One (H 1}: 
Conflict-monitoring (as measured by a meta-cognitive Stroop task) is a cognitive 
mechanism of obsessive-compulsiveness (as evaluated by combined scores on two OCD 
questionnaires - the Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire and the Padua Inventory). It is 
hypothesized that higher scores on the MCQ and the PI - indicative of a greater tendency 
towards obsessive-compulsiveness - will be predictive of higher scores on the Stroop 
task used in this study, hence providing evidence for the role of cognitive conflict-
monitoring in the pathology of OCD. 
Hypothesis Two (H22: 
PANIC/separation-distress IS significantly heightened in those who also display an 
increased tendency towards obsessive-compulsiveness, compared with the normal 
population. Separation-distress will be assessed with the PANIC Affective Neuroscience 
Personality Scale (ANPS), and significant increases in scores on this measure are 
expected to correspond to significantly higher score outcomes on obsessive-
compulsiveness, as measured by the MCQ and the PI. Confirmation of this hypothesis 
would provide reason to investigate separation-distress further, as an emotion of primary 
importance in obsessive-compulsiveness. 
Hypothesis Three (H3}: 
Conflict-monitoring and separation-distress are significantly correlated. Therefore, scores 
on the meta-cognitive Stroop task and on the ANPS PANIC sub scale are hypothesized to 











HI, and especially H2, were the primary foci of interest in this research study: the former 
sought to confirm previous research that has led to the establishment of conflict 
monitoring as a cognitive indicator of 'obsessive-compulsive' brain activity; the latter 
aimed to make a new contribution to this field of knowledge by investigating whether the 
affective experience of separation-distress - generated by certain neurobiological 
emotion system networks primarily concerned with mediating PANIC responses - is 
more prevalent or intense in those with obsessive-compulsive affective profiles. This 
would point towards separation-distress as an important possible emotional contributor to 
obsessive-compulsive tendencies. 
3.2. Design/lssues of measurement 
Three questionnaires and one short cognitive task were gIven to gather data. 
Questionnaires were considered the most time-effective means of data-collection in a 
study such as this, which required a large sample, and it was also hoped that their nature 
would strengthen the possibility of capturing the vast spectrum of behavioural, cognitive 
and emotion symptoms that may be included under the broad banner of obsessive-
compulsiveness. The first two questionnaires are validated and widely used assessments 
of OCD and were used to position participants on a spectrum in terms of their O-C 
tendencies. The Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997) was 
developed using non-clinical as well as clinical populations and its subscales have been 
found to predict worry proneness, proneness to obsessional symptoms, and anxiety. It has 
been included because it was developed using both clinical OCD patients and, 
importantly for the approach of this dissertation, members of the normal (non-OCD) 
popUlation who demonstrate a particular predilection for obsessive-compulsiveness. 
The Padua Inventory (Sanavio, 1988) is a more conventional clinical diagnostic tool for 
the disorder, discriminating well between OCD patients and those with other neurotic 
disorders. These two scales were carefully chosen from amongst the many OCD 
measures in existence, specifically for their complementary strengths: since a non-clinical 
sample was used, the MCQ seemed well suited to detect general worry-proneness, while 











clinical diagnosis sought to be established for the participants 10 this study; their 
proneness towards obsessive-compulsiveness served as an adequate means to investigate 
the hypotheses proposed. 
Separation-distress was evaluated by one of the Affective Neuroscience Personality 
Scales (ANPS; Davis, Panksepp, & Normansell, 2003). The ANPS assesses participants' 
affective profiles in terms of seven basic-emotion categories - SEEK, FEAR, CARE, 
ANGER, PLAY, SADNESS and SPIRITUALITY. The questionnaire consists of 110 
items; 14 pertain to each of the six main subscales of emotion, whilst 12 provide the 
measurement for SPIRITUALITY. There are 14 criterion items, evenly dispersed after 
each section of seven authentic items: that is, items 1 to 7 are one each of the factors 
listed above, following each other in that order, and item 8 is a criterion. The second 
SEEK item follows as item 9, and so on. Participants are required to respond to the items 
using a 4 point Likert scale, with 1 = Strongly Agree, 2 = Agree, 3 = Disagree, and 4 = 
Strongly Disagree. To guard against response sets and transparency of item meaning, the 
questionnaire has been structured so that scoring of sets of items alternate between 
negative and positive. For the negatively-scored sets, scoring is reversed so that an 
answer of Strongly Agree is scored as 4 instead of as 1, as it appears on the questionnaire 
sheet. Similarly, Agree is scored as 3 instead of 2, Disagree as 2 instead of 3, and 
Strongly Disagree as 1 instead of 4. Preservation of scoring integrity is achieved by 
manipulation of item phrasing. The positively scored sets simply require the participants' 
actual response to be recorded. The resultant overall scores are a maximum of 56 for each 
of the six main subscales, and of 48 for the SPIRITUALITY measure. 
This research was carried out with the possibility in mind that it may be extended: either 
as an imaging study in which the cognitive and affective assessments used here could be 
implemented, or as a more detailed examination of one or more of the aspects that may 
emerge from the results of this study. Thus the focus of such an extended study -
neuroimaging or otherwise - will be derived from the results and conclusions of the 











The design of this study was limited in that no qualitative, subjective data was 
systematically collected, which restricted analysis to a relatively superficial level in the 
context of the complex and highly clinically significant phenomenon of OeD. The flaw 
was, to an extent, unavoidable in a study of this magnitude, and is acceptable in the sense 
that all empirical research involves focus on a sample of the subject of research, 
necessarily limiting the perspective gained. Qualitative methods can make systematic 
evaluation difficult (Mouton, 2001), and from this point of view such methods would 
have been unsuitable for the current study. 
Additionally, a non-clinical sample was used to investigate cognitions and emotions 
specific to OeD, which decreased the need for specific qualitative symptom description 
for the purposes of clinical diagnosis. As discussed previously, a clinical diagnosis of 
OeD would have been unnecessary for this study: tendencies towards obsessive-
compulsive cognition were used to establish an OeD spectrum, which was used to 
answer the research questions. It should, however, be noted that non-clinical populations 
are generally considered in the literature as acceptable research analogues for OeD 
(Burns, Formea & Keortge, 1986). The questionnaires selected to position members of 
the normal population as more or less inclined towards OeD, necessarily have 
limitations, posing concern regarding capturing the entire symptom scope of the 
participants. To counter this possible problem, an extensive review of the various 
available questionnaires was conducted and care was taken to select those questionnaires 
considered most likely to achieve a faithful representation of participants' overall 
obsessive-compulsive profiles. 
3.3. Sampling 
A clinical OeD sample was initially considered, but because of the time and availability 
constraints involved in recruiting OeD patients, it was decided that participants should be 
sampled on a convenience basis. This decision is defensible on the basis of research on 
obsessions showing that "obsessional ruminations and unpleasant cognitive intrusions" 
(Sanavio, 1988, p. 1) are common in non-clinical groups (e.g., Rachman & de Silva, 











and obsession, although associated with significant distress and often partly diagnostic of 
emotional disorders such as OCD and Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD), occur 
frequently and normally in the non-clinical population. Therefore non-clinical samples 
are generally accepted as adequate OCD research analogues (Burns et ai., 1986), and it 
was proposed that a non-clinical, college sample be used for this dissertation. 
In consultation with an experienced statistician and professor of the Psychology 
Department at VCT, and from careful study of the development and norming of the MCQ 
and the PI, it was decided that an initial sample (those targeted to complete the MCQ and 
the PI) of 1000 college students should be located, based largely on the fact that OCD has 
a lifetime prevalence of two to three percent worldwide (Weissman et ai., 1994 in 
Whiteside et ai., 2004). In order to obtain significantly high- and low-scoring groups on 
the O-C spectrum on which to continue with conflict-monitoring and separation-distress 
research, a sufficiently large enough sample had to be tested. It was hoped that such a 
score distribution - as opposed to a clinical diagnosis of OCD - would serve to support 
any conclusions drawn from the research. 
Individuals' scores were used to construct a spectrum of tendencies ranging from normal 
to sub-clinical obsessive-compulsiveness. A highest- and lowest-scoring group were then 
chosen on which to carry out the second stage of the testing. The exact number of 
participants in each of these groups was decided upon according to analysis of the 
distribution, standard deviations and statistical power of the data collected from the 
eventual 1119 students. However, based on preliminary research of previously obtained 
data distribution resulting from use of the MCQ and the PI (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 
1997; Sanavio, 1988), it was possible to estimate that the groups would consist of 
between 15 and 25 participants each. These two groups constituted the non-clinical 
student sample. All participating students were informed that they might be called back to 












3.4.1. The initial concern of this study was to locate the non-clinical (college) sample 
participants on the continuum of obsessive-compulsiveness. In line with the vast body of 
OCD research, a multitude of measures exist. A single, established questionnaire would 
have been the simplest and most time-efficient manner of initial data collection; however, 
it seemed best to include at least two in this study, as all the questionnaires have specific 
strengths and weaknesses and it was hoped that including two would better capture the 
entire scope of participants' obsessive-compulsive (O-C) symptoms, and help minimize 
any weaknesses the individual questionnaires have. 
The Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997; see Appendix 
A) is a 65-item self-report measure that assesses beliefs about worry, intrusive thoughts 
and cognitive functioning, as well as individual differences in the ability to monitor 
thought processes. Participants respond to each item on a 4 point Likert scale (1= 'do not 
agree'; 4= 'agree very much'). The MCQ consists of 5 subscales derived from repeated 
factor analytic studies. These are: 1. Positive beliefs about worry, 2. Negative beliefs 
about the uncontrollability of thoughts and corresponding danger (e.g., my worrying 
thoughts are uncontrollable; worrying is dangerous for me), 3. Lack of cognitive 
confidence (e.g., I do not trust my memory), 4. Negative beliefs about thoughts in 
general, including themes of superstition, punishment and responsibility (e.g., it is bad to 
think certain thoughts; I will be punished for not controlling certain thoughts; if a bad 
thing happens which I have not worried about, I feel responsible), and 5. Cognitive self-
consciousness (e.g., I pay close attention to the way my mind works). 
The MCQ has good psychometric properties of reliability and validity (Wells & 
Papageorgiou, 1998): Cartwright-Hatton and Wells (1997) report Cronbach coefficient 
alphas for the individual subscales ranging from 0.72 to O.R9 as well as test-retest 
reliability coefficients after a 5-week interval ranging from 0.76 to 0.89 in a non-clinical 
sample. Significant correlation with the sub scale of uncontrollable mental activities of the 
Padua Inventory (PI) (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997) is also reported, and suggests 











(1998) report that "in accord with [their] theoretical predictions, MCQ subscales were 
positively correlated with a range of O-C symptoms". 
The MCQ appeared well suited to investigating O-C tendencies in a non-clinical sample, 
as it is not a clinically-based OCD measure, as such; its focus on worries and obsessions 
normal in everyday life made it highly suitable for the sample. The items themselves 
were derived not only from outpatients with OCD, GAD, Panic Disorder and 
Hypochondriasis, but also from normal undergraduate students. It is literally designed to 
detect worry-proneness (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997), and as such it was a good fit 
as an assessment for the non-clinical sample. This said, its non-clinical nature may have 
been disadvantageous, posing the danger of shifting the focus away from OCD. It was 
therefore proposed that it be used in conjunction with the Padua Inventory, to gain an 
acceptable rating of O-C symptoms in the non-clinical sample. 
The MCQ was used in conjunction with the Padua Inventory (Sanavio, 1988; see 
Appendix B), which is becoming popular as a way to measure O-C symptoms (Wells & 
Papageorgiou, 1998). Internal consistency and reliability are satisfactory (Sanavio, 1988). 
During development of the 60-item scale, four factors were identified: impaired control 
of mental activities (e.g., lower ability to remove undesirable thoughts, difficulty dealing 
with simple decisions and doubts), becoming contaminated, checking behaviours, and 
urges and worries of losing control over motor behaviours (Sanavio, 1988). These factors 
provided well-delineated OCD categories, which were likely to be useful during data 
analysis, in the case of conflict-monitoring and separation-distress being more 
particularly correlated with specific aspects measured by the OCD questionnaires than 
with overall obsessive-compulsive tendencies. The PI correlates well with other O-C 
symptom scales and effectively discriminates between OCD patients and those with other 
neurotic disorders (Sanavio, 1988). 
-~- .. - -- ---_. ---
3.4.2. Secondly, the participants needed to be evaluated in terms of the activity 
of their conflict-monitoring and separation-distress systems, in order to gauge I) whether 











be so, as well as 2) whether there was a significant correlation between O-C tendencies 
and the cognitive and affective components under investigation. To assess separation-
distress, the ANPS (Davis, Panksepp, & Normansell, 2003; see Appendix C) was used. 
The SADNESS scale of this instrument is the measure of PANIC/separation-distress 
(Davis, Panksepp, & Normansell, 2003); it consists of 14 items, each scored from 1 to 4, 
rendering a maximum overall score of 56. 
The other emotion subscale scores provided fertile ground for data analysis secondary to 
the main hypotheses of the study. For example, as discussed in the introductory chapters, 
anxiety is well established as a crucial emotion in OCD; in this study, scores on the 
FEAR subscale (an evaluation of participants' FEAR/ANXIETY basic-emotion systems) 
could be scrutinized in order to examine their relationship to PANIC/separation-distress 
scores. Such investigation offered the possibility of shedding light on whether, in this 
sample, fear-anxiety and separation-distress were related to obsessive-compulsiveness to 
a dissociable degree. 
To assess conflict-monitoring, the Stroop Test was adapted to the purposes of this study. 
There are numerous variations on the Stroop Test, but ultimately it assesses divided (or 
selective) attention and inhibition and how the mind and brain deal with incongruency 
between automatic and effortful cognitive processing skills; that is, the ability to inhibit 
an overlearned verbal response is tested (Stroop, 1935). In the Colour/Word Stroop, 
participants are presented with the names of colours printed in non-corresponding 
coloured ink - such as the word 'BLUE' written in green. Participants are instructed to 
respond to the colour of the ink and not to the written word (as one is automatically 
inclined to do). Thus there is conflict between one's unavoidable, immediately activated 
response and the response one is required to think carefully about and attempt to impose 
wilfully over automatic urges. A variation called the 'Emotional Stroop' follows the same 
procedure but uses words charged with negative emotion or words that provoke thought 











Participants were administered the pencil-and-paper form of the Delis-Kaplan Executive 
Function System (D-KEFS) Colour-Word Interference (Stroop) Test (Delis, Kaplan & 
Kramer, 200 I). Their performance was recorded by the researcher according to the 
standardized procedure (Total Time to Complete, Total Uncorrected Errors and Total 
Self-Corrected Errors was recorded for each of the four stimulus conditions of the task: 
Colour Naming, Word Reading, Inhibition, and Inhibition/Switching). The participant 
was then asked to provide an estimate of their overall performance on the four stimulus 
conditions, in the form of a percentage (the percentage of items they thought they 
answered correctly). 
Such data presented various possibilities for analysis, but the central concern was how 
accurately participants' actual and perceived scores accorded, providing a crude but 
arguably viable and adequate (for the purposes of this study) measure of meta-cognitive 
conflict-monitoring. This method also addressed the problem of lack of symptom-
relevance in previous studies of cognition in OCD: the current approach ensured that 
meta-cognition - essential to the nature of OCD - was assessed in the context of conflict. 
A pilot study was carried out with individuals not participating in the actual study, in 
order to refine the method and scoring of this 'Meta-cognitive Stroop', and to ensure that 
the researcher was competent in its standardized administration before beginning the 
formal data collection section of the dissertation. 
3.5. Data collectionIProcedure 
3.5.1. A vast number of participants were needed to complete the initial 
questionnaires (MCQ and PI), in order to ensure a sample size that would allow 
significant differences between the two extreme scoring groups to emerge. Thus, the 
following recruitment measures were decided upon: 1) Entry into a R 1 000 raffle reward 
was offered for participation in the research study, and 2) A system was devised whereby 
the college students were informed of the study and of the R 1 000 reward being offered 
for participation, and were then directed to complete the questionnaire on the Internet in 












A program called Perseus SurveySolutions 3.0 (1997-2000) was used to create the web 
questionnaires for the Internet. Class lists for nine 2005 undergraduate courses at UCT 
were accessed through the UCT staff and administration internet system, with the help of 
the Psychology Department secretaries. Class lists consisted of student numbers, which 
were then edited in Microsoft Excel to form email addresses by concatenating the student 
numbers with the standard UCT email addresspost-script: .. @mail.uct.ac.za ... The 
address lists were then transported into Microsoft Word and converted into paragraph 
form, to allow copying and sending of multiple addresses at a time. A copy of the email 
sent to all prospective participants is included in Appendix D. The classes were chosen 
for volume and also to represent the wide variety of faculties at UCT undergraduate level. 
They included first-year Statistics, Economics, English, Mathematics and Psychology 
courses; second-year Mathematics and Economics courses; and a third-year Accounting 
course. 
A consent form was included on the questionnaire web page created for data collection. It 
included a brief explanation that the research study was to form a neuropsychology 
Masters dissertation that aimed to investigate the way specific thoughts and emotions are 
interrelated. Participants were asked to fill in their name, telephone numbers and e-mail 
address as contact details, so that they could be contacted if they were required for the 
second round of testing or to claim the R 1 000 raffle reward. In order to safeguard 
participant recruitment for the conflict-monitoring and separation-distress testing to 
follow in the second stage of the research, it was made clear that should they fail to 
respond to a request to participate in the further testing, it would not be possible to keep 
their names in the draw for the Rl 000 raffle reward. Aside from the reasons cited above 
regarding OCD prevalence and data distribution in previous research using the MCQ and 
PI, the very large sample was also a precaution taken in light of the knowledge that some 
participants might have declined from further involvement in the research; the sample 
size was large enough to have ensured enough of a response range to allow a high- and 
low-scoring group to be collected even in the event of some participant drop-out. Lastly, 
the consent form specified that all participants agreed to take part in the study on a 











The Internet system proved extremely effective. Data bases of nme undergraduate 
courses were accessed and emails were sent to 10 000 students, advertising the study and 
urging their participation, with the possible reward as encouragement. 1119 valid 
responses were obtained (after deletion of repeat entries and of incomplete 
questionnaires ). 
3.5.2. The 50 participants selected for the second stage of testing were contacted 
by telephone and a time convenient to both themselves and the researcher was arranged 
in which the testing could be completed. All testing was carried out in the UCT 
Psychology Department, in tutorial rooms available at the testing times. Participants were 
instructed to collect the ANPS questionnaire from the Psychology Department secretary's 
office and to fill it in in their own time before their appointments, when they could hand 
it back to the researcher. This procedure was aimed at shortening the appointment time 
considerably and thus ensuring greater co-operation. At their appointment, participants 
had the Stroop Test procedure explained to them, and the administration thereof 
followed. They were then allowed and encouraged to ask any questions they had 
regarding the research procedures specifically, or the nature and purpose of the research 
study as a whole and the motivations behind it. They were given the option of a report-
back on their individual data in relation to others in the study, and of having access to the 
entire dissertation on its completion. 41 of the 50 participants completed the second stage 
of testing: 21 from the non o-c group and 20 from the O-C group. It was decided that 
this was an acceptable sample size for a study of this magnitude. 
3.6. Data capturing and editing 
3.6.1. The web page was created so that all questionnaire responses would be 
emailed to a main UCT server in a Psychology Department computer lab, in the form of 
response.tsv files: each question (numbered from 1 to 65 and from 1 to 60 on the web 
page, but from 1 to 125 in the survey program setup for purposes of response collection) 
appeared as a file, and contained all the responses received for that item. These results 











each participant and create a range of scores from which the two extreme-scoring groups 
could be selected. 
3.6.2. Data collected from the ANPS questionnaires was scored manually: all 
individual participant scores were entered into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet; the items 
that required reverse scoring were altered and input as raw data to facilitate more 
straightforward summing of factors using Excel formulas. The seven factors were 
summed to obtain an affective profile for each of the 41 participants. 
3.7. Data analysis 
Descriptive and inferential statistics were used to analyze the quantitative data. The MCQ 
and the PI were scored according to their manuals, in order to obtain a range of 
tendencies towards obsessive-compulsiveness displayed by the participants. The 
cognitive and affective tests were scored to position the participants in terms of these 
tendencies. Overall obsessive-compulsive scores as well as scores for each of the nine 
individual factors that make up the MCQ (five factors) and the PI (four factors) were 
calculated for each participant. Correlational analyses were used to rank the nine factors 
from highest to lowest in terms of their correlation with overall O-C score; such 
descriptive information may have been needed in subsequent analyses, and was also 
useful in its own right, simply in terms of providing a more detailed description of the 
data that was gathered. 
Independent t-tests were performed on the two extreme groups drawn from the sample, to 
determine whether they were significantly different (that is, that they truly represent 
different sample populations) and hence so that further analyses could be conducted using 
these two sets of scores. Independent t-tests were used to calculate whether O-C versus 
non O-C grouping had a significant effect on participants' separation-distress and 
conflict-monitoring scores. Score sets were also correlated to determine whether each 
group differed significantly in terms of its scores on separation-distress and its scores on 
conflict-monitoring. It was kept in mind that further correlations might be employed to 











(measured by the initial two questionnaires) and conflict-monitoring, depending on the 
outcome of the preceding analyses. These analyses were performed with the aim of 
investigating whether separation-distress is significantly implicated in obsessive-
compulsiveness, and also to re-establish the link between conflict-monitoring and 
obsessive-compulsive mental activity. 
3.8. Limitations 
Perhaps the most striking apparent pitfall that pervaded this design was that the data 
analysis employed was simplistic. Correlational relationships formed a substantial part of 
the analysis, and it may be argued that this kind of statistic cannot provide enough 
evidence to support results that claim to offer insight into weighty psychological matters 
such as the relationships between emotion and cognition. However, with the addition of 
the inferential statistic - the independent t-test - to data analysis, it is argued here that the 
correlational analyses may also be considered fit to answer the research questions to 
which they are assigned and that perhaps the greater mistake would be to overcomplicate 
statistical methods and techniques in order to bestow research with false depth. In the 
case of the current dissertation, although the empirical research and conceptual questions 
surrounding the key elements (cognition and emotion) are admittedly exceptionally 
complex and fundamental, care must be taken not to confuse this well of information, 
with all its intrigues and inconsistencies, with the fairly simple and straightforward 
research question that was asked: does hyperactivity in specific cognitive and affective 
tendencies co-vary with a heightened tendency towards obsessive-compulsiveness, and 
further, do such cognitive and emotional aspects co-vary to such an extent that they could 
be considered manifestations of the disorder in their respective domains? Independent t-
tests were an adequate tool to detect significant differences between the groups, whilst 
correlation assisted in providing the researcher with the best indication of relationships 
amongst the three elements under investigation. 
It is always a shortcoming to use a convenience sample of college students in order to 
collect data that one hopes to generalize - even weakly - to some larger population, 











it must be remembered that the stance in this dissertation was not so much that OCD is a 
strictly defined mental illness that must include certain symptoms and exclude others to 
be considered a definable entity (the difficulties with defining OCD at all, owing to its 
heterogeneity, have been discussed in Chapter I). The quality of the question here (and 
the answer that this dissertation provides, or contributes toward) is not diminished by the 
fact that the participants were not clinically diagnosed with OCD, as this was not the 
central focus of the empirical inquiry. Hyperactivity in brain circuits that is correlated 
with OCD is not necessarily 'pathological' - that seems a simplistic and possibly flawed 
deduction. It is more an indication of something interesting occurring at the complex 
interface of cognition and emotion in the brain, which has thus far eluded a sophisticated 
understanding on the scientist's part during the course of empirical investigation. 
Brain circuits apparently fluctuate in all people all the time and therefore those without a 
diagnosis of OCD might reach 'pathological' levels of metabolic activity in their 
orbitofrontal circuits, caudate nuclei and anterior cingulate cortices at some point in their 
existence, but just as soon return to normal or even hypometabolism in terms of these 
circuits. The focus of this dissertation was centred more on the relation of such 
hyperactivity to similarly raised activity in the other sphere of interest: the separation-
distress emotion system; and the intuition that led to linking the two brain functions is 
embedded in their close relationship with both the ACC and OCD (the latter providing a 
good platform from which to investigate these interrelations). 
Finally, it should be taken into account that using web-based data collection techniques 
does introduce the possibility of data corruption: errors may occur in the response 
collection files or when importing the files into Excel. However, owing to the need for 
such a large sample for the first part of the study, Internet-based questionnaires were the 
only practical possibility. Data corruption is a danger of research regardless of the 
method of collection, and the utmost care was taken in this case to avoid error - by 
carefully excluding duplicate entries, scanning the entries for missing data using the 












3.9. Ethical considerations 
All participants were informed of the nature and purposes of the dissertation and their 
consent was obtained on the consent form attached to the web-based questionnaires. The 
consent form explained clearly that participation in this research was voluntary and that 
subjects were completely within their right to withdraw at any point in the research 
process. It was not expected that the three questionnaires and the cognitive task used to 
collect data would upset the participants (since a non-clinical sample was being 
investigated), but the consent form advised that participants could ask for any further 
information regarding what was being studied, should it have raised any doubts in their 
minds as to their own mental health; they were encouraged to email the researcher with 
any queries they had. 
A few quenes were received from participants who were slightly concerned by the 
relevance some of the questionnaire items seemed to hold for them. These were dealt 
with by explaining the nature of the questionnaires and how they were being used in this 
dissertation. All questions asked at the testing appointments during the second stage of 
data collection were answered in full. The participants were offered any further help or 
knowledge they might have required and were encouraged to email or to set up an 
appointment with the researcher should they have felt this to be necessary. Plans were 
made to refer participants to the appropriate professionals, should this need have arisen. 
In terms of participants being rewarded for their time, all who participated were entered 
into a draw for the substantial monetary prize of R 1 000. After the second stage of testing 
and data collection had been completed, the draw was done and the winner was awarded 











Chapter 4: Results 
After the first stage of data collection (MCQ and PI web-based questionnaires), 
preliminary correlational analyses were carried out to obtain a better descriptive overview 
of the data. For each of the 1119 valid responses, scores on each of the nine factors (see 
section 3.4.1.) inherent in the two questionnaires were calculated. Participants' scores on 
the individual factors were then correlated with their overall O-C score, in order to gauge 
how indicative of obsessive-compulsiveness (as measured in this study) each of the 
factors were. Following are the factors and their attendant correlations, ranked from 
highest to lowest in terms of their accordance with overall obsessive-compulsiveness in 
this sample: PI Factor 1, Impaired control over mental activities (.89); PI Factor 3, 
Checking behaviours (.73); MCQ Factor 2, Uncontrollability and danger (.69); MCQ 
Factor 4, Themes of superstition, punishment and responsibility (.68); MCQ Factor 1, 
Positive beliefs (.65); PI Factor 2, Becoming contaminated (.63) and PI Factor 4, Urges of 
losing control over motor behaviours (.63); MCQ Factor 3, Cognitive confidence (.59); 
MCQ Factor 5, Cognitive self-consciousness (.34). Should more detailed correlations 
need to be conducted deeper into data analysis, in order to determine whether specific 
aspects or sub-components of obsessive-compulsiveness are related to separation-distress 
or to conflict-monitoring (should the overall correlations between these factors reveal no 
significant relationship), then this ordering of the OCD scale factors will be used to 
organize the approach to such further investigations. 
Howell (2002) does not recommend performing post-hoc power calculations, and 
especially in the case of significant results, there is no need to provide any further 
statistical support from this perspective. Based on previous research with the MCQ and 
PI, a sample size of either 20 or 25 from each end of the O-C spectrum was estimated to 
provide adequate power for the statistical analyses to be conducted. 25 participants were 
contacted for each of the two groups, but participant drop-out resulted in an end total of 
42 participants for the second stage of testing (21 from the non O-C group and 20 from 











4.1. The two sample groups (O-C vs non O-C) 
Before performing any statistical analyses on the sample groups drawn from the two 
extreme ends of the O-C spectrum (which was constructed with the numerous 
questionnaire responses), it was decided that the two groups should be analyzed to 
determine whether they are significantly different; that is, whether their means reflect 
separate sample populations. An independent t-test was performed on the two sets of 
scores (non O-C versus O-C): Xl = 158.619, X 2 = 404.6; Levene F (1,39) = 17.34 at 
p<.O 1, therefore t for separate variances = -41.62 at p (2-sided)<.00. The significance of 
these results is strengthened further by the fact that the t-test is one-tailed (it was 
specified before data collection that the mean of the O-C sample group was expected to 
be greater than the mean of the non O-C group, and on examination of the results it is 
apparent that the population means are indeed different in the hypothesized direction). 
Thus the two groups (non O-C versus O-C) are significantly different and this finding 
strengthens any conclusions that may be drawn from further analyses using this data. 
4.2. O-C, separation-distress and conflict-monitoring 
After the second and final stage of data collection was complete, initial statistical 
analyses were aimed at detecting the effect that the O-C (top-scoring) versus non O-C 
(bottom-scoring) grouping had on separation-distress and conflict-monitoring scores, in 
order to begin to address two of the three main hypotheses (see section 3.1.). Inferential 
analyses were carried out to investigate these relationships, as well as possible 
differences between the O-C and non O-C group in terms of the other subscales of 
emotion evaluated by the ANPS. Independent t-tests were carried out on the scores of the 
two extreme groups, for each of the emotion subscales and for the differential scores 
obtained on the meta-cognitive Stroop test. Population means for the two groups will be 
referred to throughout the results section as Xl (non O-C) and X 2 (O-C). For the 
statistical tests in which the means were hypothesized to differ in a specific direction 
(prior to commencement of data collection), one-tailed t-tests were performed. 
Firstly, it was found that scores of conflict-monitoring from the non O-C group did not 











= .34, therefore the variances did not differ significantly and t = -1.16 at p = .13. It should 
be noted, however, that the means did differ in the hypothesized direction, with the O-C 
group scoring slightly higher on average than the non O-C group on conflict-monitoring. 
Since a significant finding was hypothesized on this measure, descriptive statistical 
analyses were carried out on the conflict-monitoring score set, in order to determine its 
suitability for analysis: 
N X Confidence Confidence Min. Max. Variance St. Skewness 
{Mean1 {-95.00%1 {+95.00%1 dey. 
41 23.59 19.33 27.84 -.50 55.50 181.50 13.47 .17 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for conflict-monitoring measure 
It is apparent from Table 1 that the standard deviation (13.47) of the total group of 
conflict-monitoring scores is large enough relative to the population mean (23.59) to 
represent a normally distributed population. Therefore, any relationship between conflict-
monitoring and obsessive-compulsiveness should be revealed by correlational or any 
other analyses on this data. The data set is suitable for analysis, and is sound enough to 
answer the questions posed by the research hypotheses. A normal probability-plot was 
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Figure I: 'ormal probabilil~'- p1ot of S("'r~ di,tribUlion for conflkt-monito"; ng measure 
Figure 1 f"llber ill", I,,!!e, th<' nmm~lily "r the data and tbe fa~ t Ihal it j, adeyu~te t() 
dra ..... ronelusion, from the anal}sc, performed on it. Ellen ,ize fo r the d'lta 'et j, ,37. 
whidl Lndicatc, a relatively subsl,mlial difference bct"een tile two group'. rellecting 
,"methin~ he t ..... ""n a ,mall (. 20) and a JllediuJll (.50) effeet ,ize, a, propos.ed by Cohen 
(198R in H""ell. 20(2). 
Secondly. it " 'a' found tllal ' ep,mltion-di'lre" ,(:ore' (a' a"e"ed by the ANPS 
SADNESS snbs,alc) differed significantly between tllC two gronp': XL = 30,9(). Xl = 
40.55: Levene (3.17, 39) = .0R and thcrefore t = -6.59 at p<,O I. 
".3. O-C and OIiler ,\~PS emot ion su lJ'icale<; 
Seores on the ANPS ,ub,calc SEEK dllJ nOI diffcr signifi,amly octwccn the t ..... o groups: 











= 1.61 at p = .12. This t-test was 2-sided, as no direction was hypothesized for the 
differing population means prior to data collection. 
FEAR subscale scores on the ANPS differed significantly between the two groups: 
Xl = 29.76, X 2 = 43.50; Levene (3.76, 39) = .06, t = -8.19 at p<.01. 
ANGER sub scale scores on the ANPS differed significantly between the two groups: 
Xl = 32.86, X 2 = 39.45; Levene (3.62, 39) = .06, t = -3.04 at p = .004. 
CARE subscale scores on the ANPS did not differ significantly between the two groups: 
Xl = 40.38, X 2 = 41.60; Levene (1.81, 39) = .19, t = -.68 at p = .50. 
PLAY subscale scores on the ANPS did differ significantly between the two groups: 
Xl = 44.00, X 2 = 37.65; Levene (.26, 39) = .61, t = 3.91 at p<.01. 
SPIRITUALITY subscale scores on the ANPS did not differ significantly between the 
two groups: Xl = 30.19, X 2 = 31.30; Levene (.71, 39) = .40, t = -.67 at p = .51. 
In summary, from these initial analytical investigations, it emerges that scores on 
separation-distress, anxiety, anger and seriousmindedness (as evaluated by the ANPS 
subscales SADNESS, FEAR, ANGER and PLAY, respectively) are significantly 
influenced by whether the participant falls into the non O-C or O-C group. 
4.4. Conflict-monitoring and separation-distress 
Two sets of correlations were carried out to determine whether separation-distress and 
conflict-monitoring were related. For both groups, correlational analyses were carried out 
on overall conflict-monitoring scores as related to SADNESS subscale scores on the 
ANPS. Neither group showed significant evidence of a relationship between separation-
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4.5. 1\1 ('Q 3nd PI f3ctors ",Iated to conl1ict-lIlonitorin!! 3nd S('par.ll ion-distre,s 
A'i discm;s,cd at the beginning of the result, see lion. il will now be relevant to inyest igate 
whelher any of llie specific factor itenb of thc MCQ and PI arc significantly related to 
eilher <;epara(ion-di,(re" or m nn ic!-rnonilOring. , ince ",crall .,"'orC, on ohse"j,c-
cornpul'ijvcness fwl 10 rcyca l Jn y such relation"h ips, It may al", he wonhwhile to 
analyzc possible relationsh ips he lween the'ic factors and the other cmotion 'iubscales of 
(he ANPS (e'pel'i all)' Iho,e Ihal "ere fOlilld to IJ,: significWlll)' influenl'cd by Ihe O-C 
,er,u, non (j-C grmlping; FEAR. A'1GER and PLAY). Again. to ,(reng(hen any 
difference, found belween group" with regard, (0 Ihe OeD y"eSlionnaire scale fa<:lor" 
indcpendent He,,, were performed on thc ,core, from Ihe two group" for ea<:h of the 
nine factors: 
FadoT Valid" .& '" T df • :>'ICQ I " 24.24 53.55 ·1);3<) '0.41 <.01 -
i\lCQ 2 " D I') 50.XO -1').22 .10 <.01 _. - i i\lCQ 3 " 11.33 27-'JO 13.<)2 21.')2 <.01 
I\ICQ 4 " 1'1.33 , 37.70 ·17,2 1 39 <.01 
I\ICQ 5 " 14,00 20,20 -6,56 .N <.01 
PI I 41 I );, 14 b6,30 -25,04 20.49 <,01 
PI2 " I 3.2<) ,7 10 -12.4 I 2224 <.01 --
,'] 3 " '),2] 2<) I', -1.1.71 211.,2 <.01 --- ._- J ]'] 4 " 7.4R 22,75 - I 1.2<) 19,67 <.01 . __ . --
Tallie 2: Inde[1<'"deol I-Ie<;l re<;ull< for t)_C ". 000 0 ·(: j(rouj) 00 311 "inr (lCI) 1'3 clor< 
Tahll' 2 demonstra le, Ihal pa rti cipant> from Ihe 1"0 groups ,<:ored ,ignificunlly 










4.5.1. MCQ and PI factors as related to conflict-monitoring 
More detailed correlations between conflict-monitoring scores and the nine separate OCD 
questionnaire factors were carried out; since an independent t-test showed no significant 
differences between the O-C and non O-C group on this measure. It was decided before 
any analyses were performed that, should the t-test not reveal significant differences, 
correlations between each of the factors and the overall conflict-monitoring scores would 
be carried out in order to determine whether any of the specific factors are indeed related 
to the conflict-monitoring measure. Analyses were performed for each of the two groups 
separately, as well as for the two groups combined. Previous results indicating the rank of 
factors in terms of their correlation with overall O-C scores (see introduction to Results 
section) were used to guide the order in which these factors were analysed; based on this 
order, each factor was considered less likely than the preceding one to reveal a significant 
relationship to conflict-monitoring. In Table 3 below, the factors are reordered as they 
occur in the questionnaires. Valid N = 41 for all factors; conflict-monitoring has been 
abbreviated to C-M; direction of correlation is shown in the last column, r(X,Y): 
FACTOR rL t .I! St. dey. X {Mean} R{X,Y} 
C-M OCD C-M OCD 
factor factor 
MCQ Combined .02 .81 .43 13.47 15.65 23.59 38.54 .13 
1 Non O-C .09 -1.39 .18 14.98 3.63 21.21 24.24 -.30 
O-C .00 -.15 .88 11.54 6.19 26.08 53.55 -.04 
MCQ Combined .04 1.26 .21 13.47 14.69 23.59 36.66 .20 
2 Non O-C .05 .95 .35 14.98 4.50 21.21 23.19 .21 
O-C .01 -.40 .70 11.54 4.70 26.08 50.80 -.09 
MCQ Combined .05 1.41 .17 13.47 9.16 23.59 19.41 .22 
3 Non O-C .00 -.02 .98 14.98 1.46 21.21 11.33 -.00 
O-C .06 1.04 .31 11.54 5.13 26.08 27.90 .24 
MCQ Combined .01 .64 .52 13.47 9.89 23.59 28.29 .10 











O-C .02 -.63 .54 11.54 3.25 26.08 37.70 -.15 
MCQ Combined .02 .93 .36 13.47 4.33 23.59 17.02 .15 
5 Non O-C .03 .71 .48 14.98 2.83 21.21 14.00 .16 
O-C .02 -.16 .55 11.54 3.22 26.08 20.20 -.14 
PI 1 Combined .04 1.21 .23 13.47 25.08 23.59 41.63 .19 
Non O-C .01 .40 .69 14.98 1.71 21.21 18.14 .09 
O-C .00 .29 .78 11.54 8.44 26.08 66.30 .07 
PI2 Combined .05 1.41 .17 13.47 13.44 23.59 24.90 .22 
Non O-C .01 .40 .69 14.98 2.47 21.21 13.29 .20 
O-C .02 .63 .54 11.54 8.24 26.08 37.10 .15 
PI3 Combined .02 .85 .40 13.47 11.03 23.59 18.95 .14 
Non O-C .01 .36 .72 14.98 1.22 21.21 9.24 .08 
O-C .02 -.67 .51 11.54 6.38 26.08 29.15 -.16 
PI4 Combined .01 .52 .61 13.47 8.78 23.59 14.93 .08 
Non O-C .05 -.96 .35 14.98 .81 21.21 7.48 -.22 
O-C .06 -1.04 .31 11.54 6.00 26.08 22.75 -.24 
Table 3: Correlational statistics for the relation between OCD factors and C-M 
Table 3 illustrates that there are no significant effects. Again it is noted that these results 
are based on the normally distributed C-M score population, which should reveal any 
significant differences that do occur in the data. It is also noted that, although none of the 
results reported in Table 3 are significant, the effect size for this measure is .37, which 














4.5.2. Correlation, of l\ICQ and 1'1 radors with st-para lion-distress 
Valid ~ " . .u for all factor.< • ..eparation-ui,tn"" ha, been abbrc~ iatcd to S_I) : dife,lion of 
c"rrelat~'Jl i , shown il1 1he b,t column. r(X.V): all ,igllificant result, arc highlighted ill 
red: 
FACTOR , , Q St. dn. X Il\Ican) R(X,Y ) 
! 
S-D Oe D s·n oeD 
, rador factor 
l\ICQ Combined .55 6.9 j 00 6.73 15.05 I 35.6 I -'H_ 5 ~ 7·-1 
._. , :-ron O-C , ,()() , -.06 .% 3.83 3.63 30.90 24.24 -.0 1 
O-C , ,13 I,M 12 5 A4 (, . I \J 140.55 53.55 .30 
--
MCQ Comhin;,,:! .5R 7.27 .m 6.73 14.6') Yi .61 3(,.6(, .70 
-_. 
2 :-<011 O-C m " .m 3Kl 4.50 -'11.90 n iSi .I~) o-c .24 2.37 "_, 544 -uu 40.55 5O.RO 49 
I MCQ C"omhilled 37 4.75 00 6.73 9.16 35.61 19.41 .61 
3 ."on o·e 07 - 1.1 R .25 '_~3 I Ali JO,YO 11 .33 .26 
1 -'i05~ -o-c .05 ·.95 .-'5 5.44 5.1.1 2780 -.22 
. 
l\ICQ Combine(j 41 5.lD 00 6.73 9.8<1 J5.fil 2R .2'1 '" 4 "'Jon O-C ,0 1 .31 76 3.83 3 ,57 30,90 19.-'13 .07 
. , 
O-C 10 - 1 .~3 .O~ 5,44 3,25 .to,55 ~7.70 -040 
- . . - .. - -
MCQ ComhiJled ,. . _) .1.65 .lJll 6.73 ·U3 35,61 17.0~ ,50 , Kon O-C 24 -~A7 {)~ .~ ~3 :> ~, l(l 'Xl 14.(Hl -A'J 






"" Combined .55 6.97 .lJll 6,73 25.08 35,61 41.63 74 , ."on O-C ,jJ l.G~ .ll H3 1.7 1 30 ,90 18.14 ,36 
-
O-C , 06 1,11 .2g 5.44 ~.44 40,55 66.30 ,25 
1'12 C'omhined .-'17 4.7') .O() 6 .73 13.44 3.~,61 24,9(l .6 1 
- ", -:-ro n O-C ,111 ,38 .7 1 3.83 12.47 -'lll'Xl 1.'-29 
O=C. . .0,1 -.85 AO 5.,t 4 ~,24 40.55 37. 10 . .10 
. --
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Th" re,uU, in Tahle -I support the earlier ~port Ihal participants' '('"'''' on ,eparalioo-
(Ii'lres, are in fa..:l significantly inl1uen~eJ loy lheir grouping;1, eilher o-e or non O-C 
(,ee section 4.2.). V~I"", in Table -I illu,trate lh~l "hen the lWo gr(MJP" O-C '('0"" a", 
correl~lcd wil11 their SoD scores. (he,e 1"0 rne~sure, are significantly correlated, for all 
nine f..:tor,. I'unher, for :o.1CQ tador :2 CNeglll!<'e bdir!1 aooHI rlw ClJ'1lroi {)fl1wullhl.\ 
(Jill! Correspondin/: DUII):er), the O-C group's S·D and 0 C scores ~rc signi ficantly 
corrda(ed when treated as 11 separate group. wil .. :rca, the nOll 0 ·(' group's scores are not. 
Similarly. for MCQ Factor 5 (COl:nilil'e Seif-Co",(';O",,,,',;'). the nO" O-C group's S-D 
and O-C 'CO"", are signillcalltly ('orrclated when l~..llCd as a ,eparate group. whereas the 
-' .6. Cunllict·munitoring (nlw scores). 0·(' and s~para tion· distr~$s 
Gi\'en the ul1exp"'cteu ""ult, thal faded 10 re,'eal any 'ignillcant relatiom,hip' (either 
causal or correlationa l) between the measure of contlict-monitoring u>cd in this study and 
those of o -e and ><-'paralion-di,tress. some funher and final ,tat;stical analy,e' were 
carried out ulillg the raw .,('ore.' obtained on the Stroop te,t by participant, of the second 
part or the stud}' . Fir,t participant,' o\·erall score out of 200 (each or the t'lur StHX>P 
,timulu\ ('OnUiliom, c<""i,h or 50 item~) wa, ta~en a, a measure of cont1ict-monitoring. 
~nu correlated with (~) overall O-C '>Core, ('ee Tahle 5) and (h) ,eparation-uist""I, 













T 1\ 'e~n rlX,Yl 
,., 
C-M 193,56 4.10 1.00 roo -1 X2 
O-C 21U,(, I 25_R(i -_2R OR - 1 _R2 
Table 5: (' orr~lational statistics for [he relation b{'{"ecn o"crall O-C and C-l\! score, (OUl of 
11M)) 
I\I"",, SI. \)e,'. l'(X.Y) , , p , 
SoD 35_ld (i_ n roo 1_00 -1,30 _20 41 
c-" 193.56 4.10 -,20 IJ4 -uo .20 4 1 _ 
TalM 6, Correl3tion31 "3(i«;0. for (he relation bet"ecn overall SoD and C-1\! scores (OUl of 
2001 
Second_ t-te,t, (indepe ndent b} gfOUp) were carricd out to in\'csliga!C whcther grouping 
in (he 'llH..l)' had an effect ')[I C-r., and SoD scores. In both analyses, GROCP (O-C vs non 
O-C) wa, u,ed a, Ihe indepc,illent variah le. wi lh CoM (score OU I of 2(0) mill O-C (o\'Cml l 
"-'ore) ,erving ~, lhe two dependent variahlc,. The re,ulb are shown below. in Table 7 
and Tallie II, re'>IXc li \'ei )' 
._--,--
_" can I " can !-,alue " I' 2- t sepal'. or non o-~: o·e sided , '31'. pst. 
C-1\1 194_7 1 192,35 1.91 i 39 .06 I.S9 34.65 
o-e 15~,62 4W.70 -42.13 3l) ()() -41,7" 20_ .. /(, 
P Va lid "alid St. St. 'l p Lewn" " p , NO- D", . Dc,'. F Lnene Lpwne , 
nOn C '\1o" O-C ( l ,d O 
o-e o·e , .. __ . -C· m , 21 20 3_32 4,56 1.89 , . 17 2.14 W . 15 
" I o-c m 21 20 ~_19 25_R7 24_81 Jf) 17_14 W 00 
Table 7: Hest analysc< of o"erall 0-(' scores and C-I\I scur~~ (ont of 2(0) 
Il i, importanllO note Ihat all the significanl scores simply renect and confirm previou< 










l\Ie3n \!e3 n 1-'a1ue df p t sep. Uf 
nOn O-C O-C "al'. cst . 
SoD .HF)!) .to.55 -6.5" 3" .00 -6.53 H9R 
C-1\I I 9.t .7 I 1 9~.35 1.91 YJ ,~ 1. ~t) 34,65 
P 1- \'31 id Valid SI. SI. F-ratio p Le' ene p 
sided , N 0- , Dey. Uev. '3riancc.' 'aria ncc.' F l.cHne 
non C Noo O-C 11.df) 
O-C O-C 
SoD .00 " 20 3,83 5,44 'JP I .B .,. I ~ ,O~ C- .07 " " , .D2 .t.56 I .~'! .<7 2,1 4 ,15 " 
T "hl~ 8; t-t~sl an"t~'s~s of o""r alJ SoD sror,'s "nd C-M scorrs (out of ~(H)) 
Similarly, in Tahle 8, il j" e\'ident that SoD was found to he significan tly di fferenl 
o"l\\-een Ifle IWO group., (a fi ndi ng al ready cstabli,hcd). "hibl alMly.'e, conlinue to 
r~t1ccI a non->lgnijicalll CHeCI in term, of the C-M me,-,-, ure. 
Third, To/ul Error Score can ab o be c()midered ~ raw me~'lirc of p~rticipallis' conniCI· 
lllon iloring Iei'd" and "a, included in the,e amly,e, for the purpos.c of lhorough 
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T "bl~ 9: C"rre1 alion,,1 , 1:11;,1;rs for the J"t·Jation bet",e,'n onrall O_C ,core:<. "nd T(~"I Error 
& un' {C-.\J l 
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Similarly, Total Completion Time on the Stroop task may be used as a raw measure of 
conflict-monitoring, since "the primary method for analyzing performance on the D-
KEFS Colour-Word Interference Test is based on the number of seconds that the 
examinee takes to complete each of the four conditions" (Delis et aI., 2001, p. 97) and 
"the completion-time score for each condition provides a global measure of performance 
on that task" (Delis et aI., 2001, p. 101): 
Mean St. Dev. r(X,Y) r.! t p N 
C-M 164.02 27.04 1.00 1.00 1.46 .15 41 
(Time) 
O-C 278.66 125.86 .23 .05 1.46 .15 41 
Table 11: Correlational statistics for the relation between overall o-c scores and Total 
Completion Time (C-M) 
Mean St. Dev. r(X,Y) r.! t p N 
S-D 35.61 6.73 1.00 1.00 .16 .87 41 
C-M 164.02 27.04 .00 .00 .16 .87 41 
(Time) 
Table 12: Correlational statistics for the relation between overall S-D scores and 
Total Completion Time (C-M) 
The above results show that there is not a statistically significant difference, which adds 
weight to the conclusion that, in this sample at least, there really is no demonstrable 
effect of O-C versus non O-C grouping on the conflict-monitoring measure. The average 
total times for the two samples are 158.04 seconds (non O-C) and 170.30 seconds (O-C) 
- these descriptive statistics reinforce the conclusion of non-significance, since there is 
no obvious discrepancy between the averages (although they do differ in the 
hypothesized direction). 
Finally, Total Completion Time (as a measure of conflict-monitoring) was correlated with 
a single O-C factor from the initial two questionnaires: Cognitive self-consciousness 











least correlated with the overall O-C measurement and therefore the one that would most 
likely reveal any kind of relationship with conflict-monitoring: 
Mean St. Dev. r(X,Y) rl t p N 
C-M 164.02 27.04 1.00 1.00 .02 .98 41 
(Time) 




Table 13: Correlational statistics for the relation between Total Completion Time (C-M) 
and MCQ Factor 5 (O-C) 
Since no significant results were obtained with this factor, it can be concluded that none 
of the other factors (all of which are more closely related to overall O-C scores) will 
reveal anything contrary. 
Use of t-tests confirmed that GROUPING (i.e. O-C vs non O-C) did not affect either (a) 
Total Error Score or (b) Total Completion Time (both of which were used as the 
dependent variable, C-M, in analyses): (a) XI = 5.29, X 2 = 7.65; t = -1.91 at p = .06, and 











Chapter 5: Discussion 
5.1. Conflict-monitoring and O-C 
Based on the independent t-test and correlational analyses, there did not appear to be a 
significant difference between the non O-C and the O-C group on the measure of 
conflict-monitoring. Conflict-monitoring scores were not significantly different between 
the two groups when overall O-C scores were analysed, and no significant differences 
appeared between them on anyone of the nine OCD questionnaire factors, either. Since 
the score distribution of the conflict-monitoring measure was concluded to be normal (see 
section 4.2., Figure 1 and Table 1), there are various conclusions that may be drawn 
from this unexpected finding. 
First, it must be considered that there is in fact no difference between people who are 
inclined towards obsessive-compulsiveness and those who are not, in terms of their levels 
of conflict-monitoring. This seems unlikely as a final and straightforward conclusion, 
however, since previous empirical research has established such a link using 
neuroimaging techniques. In light of the fact that most of the evidence for the correlation 
between conflict-monitoring and obsessive-compulsiveness is derived from the 
neuroimaging paradigm, a second and more realistic explanation for the lack of 
significance achieved in this area of the current research might be that such differences, 
should they exist, are subtle enough to escape evaluation by means of the meta-cognitive, 
pencil-and-paper task that was employed, and require neuroimaging analysis to 
demonstrate any differences between two such groups. 
Third, it must be considered that the non-significance indicates not that there are no such 
differences between obsessive-compulsiveness and conflict-monitoring in reality, but that 
there is simply no significant difference hetween the two measures in this sample. 
Perhaps the non-clinical status of the two groups led to this insignificance. This is, 
however, unlikely, since such a large initial sample was obtained and the extreme high-











incidence in this sample is two percent, compared with the estimated OCD lifetime 
prevalence of two to three percent (Robins et aI., 1984 in Maltby et aI., 2004). 
It is also possible that significance did not occur in this sample because the two groups 
drawn were too small; however, power calculations indicate that a sample size of 20 in 
each group is sufficient to obtain a respectable power statistic (see introduction to 
Results section). Fourth and lastly, it is possible that the conflict-monitoring measure 
used in this study (that is, obtaining differential scores on a 'meta-cognitive' type Stroop) 
is too weak to pick up any differences that may exist between the two groups. The 
reliability of the measure is unestablished, since no similar use of the Stroop test (nor any 
other suitable conflict-monitoring measure) could be found in the literature. It is not 
possible to establish the reliability, since there is only a single measure of discrepancy-
detection in the study; therefore, reliability could be low, contributing to the lack of 
significance obtained using this measure. Based on the balance of all the evidence 
considered above, it seems most probable that the second and fourth considerations 
discussed here (that is, removing the measure from the neuroimaging paradigm and using 
a weak conflict-monitoring measure, respectively) are responsible for the lack of 
significance found for support of the first hypothesis. Thus for HI, it is necessary to 
accept the null hypothesis that conflict-monitoring in fact does not constitute a possible 
mechanism of OCD, based on this research sample. 
5.2. Separation-distress and O-C 
Based on the independent t-test and correlational analyses, there is a significant 
difference between the non O-C and O-C group on the measure of separation-distress. 
Separation-distress scores were significantly different between the two groups when 
overall O-C scores were analysed, and significant differences were also revealed between 
the groups when further, detailed correlational analyses of the nine OCD questionnaire 
factors were carried out. Additionally, the groups scored significantly differently on the 
separation-distress factor in the hypothesized direction (XI = 30.90, X 2 = 40.55) and the 
t-value (t = -6.59 at p<.OI) was of sufficient magnitude to enhance this finding further. 











distress IS significantly implicated in obsessive-compulsiveness, and could be 
conceptualized as an affective correlate of OCD and of tendencies towards the disorder. 
The psychoanalytical perspective of OCD as an obsessional neurosis involving 
heightened separation-distress (i.e., pathological difficulty with letting go and accepting 
loss) is therefore supported by the findings of this dissertation. Furthermore, the link 
between conflict-monitoring and separation-distress, although not vindicated by the 
conflict-monitoring results in this study, cannot be dismissed, especially considering that 
previous research implicates heightened ACC activity in OCD, and that the PANIC or 
separation-distress emotion system appears to overlap largely with this same extended 
neuroanatomical and neurochemical network in the mammalian brain. 
Regarding further statistical analyses carried out to investigate the relationship between 
separation-distress and OCD or obsessive-compulsiveness, detailed analyses were 
conducted to determine to what extent each of the nine OCD questionnaire factors are 
related to separation-distress scores. Results showed that when the two groups' O-C 
scores are correlated with their separation-distress scores, these two measures are 
significantly correlated, for all nine factors. The factors are ranked in the following order, 
in terms of what percentage they contribute to the significantly higher sconng on 
separation-distress: obsessive-compulsiveness as represented by MCQ Factor 2, 
Uncontrollability and danger, explains 58% of the variance of separation-distress scores 
between the two groups (r2 = .58); MCQ Factor 1, Positive beliefs about 1vor1)', and PI 
Factor 1, Impaired control over mental activities, both explain 55% (r2 = .55); PI Factor 
3, Checking behaviours, explains 44% (r2 = .44); PI Factor 4, Urges and worries of 
losing control over motor behaviours, explains 42% (r2 = .42); MCQ Factor 4, 
Superstitions of punishment and responsibility, explains 41 % (r2 = .41); PI Factor 2, 
Becoming contaminated, and MCQ Factor 3, Cognitive confidence, both explain 37% (r2 
= .37); and MCQ Factor 5, Cognitive self-consciousness, explains 25 % (r2 = .25). Such 
statistics demonstrate that whether participants were in the non O-C or the O-C group had 
a substantial effect on their affective profile in terms of their separation-distress scores as 
measured by the SADNESS subscale of the ANPS. The r2 statistics obtained in these 











explanation in the score vanance between the groups, which strongly supports the 
hypothesis that PANIC or separation-distress is implicated as a central emotion in OCO 
or in tendencies towards the disorder. The power calculations for Pearson's r in these 
analyses reveal power coefficients as follows, using the same ranked order as factors are 
given in above: .99, .98, .98, .95, .94, .93, .90, .90 and .72. These are high power 
coefficients for Pearson's r (Howell, 2002), a fact which further strengthens the 
conclusion that separation-distress is significantly related to obsessive-compulsiveness. 
Further, for MCQ Factor 2 (Negative beliefs about the Control of Thoughts and 
Corresponding Danger), the O-C group's S-O and O-C scores are significantly correlated 
when treated as a separate group (with a power coefficient of .87), whereas the non O-C 
group's scores are not. Similarly, for MCQ Factor 5 (Cognitive Self-Consciousness), the 
nOll O-C group's S-O and O-C scores are significantly correlated when treated as a 
separate group (with a power coefficient of .78), whereas the O-C group's scores are not. 
These two results - represented by the O-C factors most and least correlated with S-O, 
respectively - strengthen the evidence that, in terms of separation-distress, the score 
populations are independent. 
5.3. Conflict-monitoring and separation-distress 
No significant relationship was found between the measures of separation-distress and 
conflict-monitoring in this dissertation. This is to be expected, based on the preceding 
analyses that show a non-significant relationship between O-C and conflict-monitoring, 
but a significant relationship between O-C and separation-distress. It follows logically 
that no significant results would be obtained by correlating separation-distress with 
conflict-monitoring. It is debatable to what extent this result affects the conclusions that 
may be drawn from this dissertation (see section 5.5. below). 
5.4. The other emotions and O-C 
Analyses not central to the hypotheses of this dissertation but nevertheless beneficial in 
understanding and drawing conclusions from the findings, involved the six affective 
categories that were assessed by the ANPS in addition to separation-distress: FEAR 











(seriousmindedness), and SPIRITUALITY. Independent t-tests showed that anxiety, 
anger and seriousmindedness (as evaluated by the ANPS subscales FEAR, ANGER and 
PLA Y, respectively) are also significantly related to obsessive-compulsiveness, whereas 
curiosity/goal-directed behaviour, spirituality and caring (assessed by SEEK, 
SPIRITUALITY and CARE, respectively) are not. For the FEAR subscale, the means 
differed in the expected direction (based on the substantial body of empirical literature 
regarding anxiety in OCD, e.g., Dorfan & Woody, 2006; Kim & Gorman, 2005; Mancini 
& Gangemi, 2004; Whiteside, Port, Deacon & Abramowitz, 2006); with those in the O-C 
group scoring significantly higher on FEAR than those in the non O-C group. Participants 
in the O-C group scored significantly higher on the ANGER subscale than those in the 
non O-C group, whereas this result was reversed for scores on the PLAY factor: O-C 
participants scored significantly lower on this subscale than those in the non O-C group. 
Although no directional hypotheses were specified for the latter two results, they are in 
accordance with general expectations of O-C mentality: anger is invariably linked to 
frustration and fear, predicting a higher score on the ANGER subscale for those inclined 
towards obsessive-compulsiveness (e.g., Offer, Lavie, Gothelf and Apter (2000) found 
that several defences distinguished different groups of psychiatric patients from controls, 
and that a few defences - namely projection, displacement and regression - correlated 
significantly with anger and especially distinguished the OCD patients from other 
psychiatric groups and from controls); and seriousrnindedness is predicted by the 
characteristic rigidity, obsessive attention to detail and goal-setting - as well as, again, 
heightened levels of fear - in those with or inclined towards OCD (Cassin & von Ranson, 
2005; Nelson, Abramowitz, Whiteside & Deacon, 2006; Spano, 2001), which leads to the 
inverse characteristic of a significantly lower tendency towards playfulness. 
It is crucial to notice that, in this sample, there was in fact a larger differential score 
between the two groups on the FEAR subscale (XI = 29.76, X 2 = 43.50) than on the 
SADNESS subscale (XI = 30.90, X 2 = 40.55), as well as an larger attendant t statistic 
(-8.19 vs -6.59); both analyses were significant at the level of p<.O 1. The factors ANGER 











their respective differential sizes, completing the rank of the four affective scales that 
yielded significant differences in this sample. The important observation here, however, 
concerns the FEAR and SADNESS scales, since the former is traditionally established as 
the central emotion in OCD and the latter is the pivotal affect under investigation in this 
study. It was considered that separation-distress (SADNESS), rather than anxiety 
(FEAR), is the central emotion in OCD or O-C cognitions and behaviour, and that fear-
anxiety - while clearly fundamental in the disorder - is more likely closely related to, and 
possibly a result of, the catalyst PANIC emotion. Though scores on the FEAR subscale of 
the ANPS implemented in this study did yield a greater differential than the SADNESS 
scale, this unfortunately does not confirm which of the two affects is the catalyst and 
which is the resultant emotion (or whether indeed the two are even related in this 
manner). However, the dissertation does provide evidence both to re-confirm the 
importance of anxiety in the disorder (or in such disordered ways of thinking, feeling and 
behaving) and to argue that PANIC or separation-distress is just as critical in the affective 
manifestation thereof. The fact that anxiety was found to be so convincingly significant 
adds great weight to the significant findings of this dissertation for separation-distress, 
since it serves to support the new findings with established research, in the same set of 
data. 
5.5. Considerations 
It is important to put the lack of significance obtained for HI in perspective - this 
relationship between factors was needed to rationalize investigation of the connection 
between S-D and O-C, which was indeed significant (and which forms the main thrust of 
the thesis), so from this point of view, it is less relevant that no significant effect was 
found. However, critics will argue that the finding for HI is indeed very significant, 
precisely because the rationale for proposing H2 in this study was based upon it. It 
remains to be debated whether the significance of the finding regarding H2 in any way 
relies upon a positive finding in HI; however, the value of this dissertation is not at the 
mercy of the outcome of such a debate, since alternative explanations have been provided 











5.6. Implications for emotion in OCD 
It appears that separation-distress (or the basic emotion, PANIC, which underlies the 
consciously experienced feeling of separation-distress at a neurophysiological level) is 
strongly implicated in tendencies towards obsessive-compulsiveness and, based on the 
strong sampling procedures in this study, very possibly in OCD. Clearly, FEAR is also 
crucial in the experience of obsessive-compulsive mental states; however, the established 
knowledge that it is the central or driving emotion is brought into question by the current 
findings. This study provides motivation to investigate more closely whether a 
pathological sensitivity to or activation of the PANIC/separation-distress basic emotion 











Chapter 6: Conclusions and recommendations for future research 
6.1. Limitations 
It is important to consider the conclusions discussed above, drawn from the statistical 
findings, with the shortcomings of research design that unfortunately attend the study. 
First, a college sample was used in this dissertation: although care was taken to sample 
from a wide variety of undergraduate disciplines in order to achieve some sense of cross-
sectionality in the sample, it was ultimately homogeneous by necessity (given the 
accessibility of undergraduate university students). College students represent a unique, 
select portion of the larger population, and hence conclusions made on the basis of such a 
sample must be considered in this light. However, in defence of the sample, it is 
reiterated that the strong sampling procedures (in terms of number of participants tested 
initially and then secondarily), in which OCD lifetime prevalence figures of two to three 
percent (Robins et aI., 1984 in Maltby et aI., 2004) were matched by drawing 20 
participants from each end of a spectrum of 1119 respondents (creating a two percent 
"OCD incidence rate" in this sample) at least to some extent counteract this limitation 
and lend the conclusions greater persuasive power than a college sample would otherwise 
merit. 
Second, practical constraints on this empirical study demanded that a limited array of 
specific questionnaires and tests be employed in an attempt to investigate exceptionally 
complex cognitive and affective characteristics of the participants. Time and resource 
constraints, as well as the sheer implicit complexity of the subject of research, inevitably 
posed the insurmountable challenge of obtaining a completely accurate idea of the 
cognitive and affective profiles of participants. Ideally, quantitative data would be 
supplemented by an in-depth qualitative research component, which could assist in 
placing the obsessive-compulsive tendencies of each subject under investigation in their 
individual contexts. It would also be useful to conduct the same investigations on 
participants diagnosed with clinical OCD, and on non-clinical participants (such as those 
in this study) evaluated by a different set of questionnaires and cognitive tasks. Such 











6.2. Suggestions for future research 
The current dissertation could usefully be extended into a neuroimaging study, in which 
separation-distress could be focused on, given the present significant results. Perhaps a 
sample of clinical OCD patients could be recruited in order to study ACC activity in 
response to affective - as opposed to cognitive (for example, conflict-monitoring) - tasks, 
specifically those that elicit separation-distress, as well as the fear-anxiety response 
(again, to strengthen any evidence obtained with regard to PANIC). To further investigate 
the degree of difference between those clinically diagnosed with OCD and those with 
strong tendencies towards it - and so to investigate the merit of a spectrum 
conceptualization of the disorder or group of disorders - a series of cross-sectional 
studies of the kind briefly mentioned above (in section 6.1.) could be carried out. For 
example, clinical, sub-clinical and non-clinical samples could be tested using the same 
constellation of assessments; followed by new samples of clinical, sub-clinical and non-
clinical participants tested with evaluations that may capture different aspects of their 
obsessive-compulsiveness. 
More detailed investigation of how PANIC and separation-distress are implicated in 
OCD could be attempted, not necessarily within the neuroimaging paradigm. It would be 
useful to devise a study to research the interconnection demonstrated in this dissertation 
between FEAR and SADNESS on the ANPS subscales, that is, one that tries to ascertain 
whether one emotion may be the primary, instigating affect of the disorder whilst the 
other constitutes more of a secondary affect, since they are clearly closely related and 
both are crucial to the experience of obsessive-compulsive cognition and emotion. Such 
findings would be valuable in terms of their implications for cognitive-behavioural as 
well as for psychiatric treatment of the disorder, and could also make a significant 
contribution to understanding the mechanism that operates this pathological and 
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APPENDIX A: The Meta-cognitions Questionnaire (MCQ) 
Instructions: 
This questionnaire is concerned with beliefs people have about their thinking. Listed below are a number of 
beliefs that people have expressed. Please read each item and indicate how much you generally agree with 
it by circling the appropriate number. Please respond to all of the items, there are no right or wrong 
answers. 
1. Worrying helps me to avoid problems 
in the future. 
2. Worrying is dangerous for me. 
3. I have difficulty knowing if I have actually 
done something, or just imagined it. 
4. I think a lot about my thoughts. 
5. I could make myself sick with worrying. 
6. I am aware of the way my mind works when 
I am thinking about a problem. 
7. If I did not control a worrying thought, and then 
it happened, it would be my fault. 
8. If I let my worrying thoughts get out of control, 
they will end up controlling me. 




10. I have little confidence in my memory for words and names. 
II. My worrying thoughts persist, no matter how I try 
to stop them. 
12. Worrying helps me to get things sorted out in my mind. 
13. I cannot ignore my worrying thoughts. 
14. I monitor my thoughts. 
15. I should be in control of my thoughts all the time. 
16. My memory can mislead me at times. 
17. I will be punished for not controlling certain thoughts. 
18. My worrying could make me go mad. 
"agree "agree "agree very 
slightly" moderately" much" 
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19. If I do not control my worrying thoughts, they could come true. 











21. Worrying puts my body under a lot of stress. 
22. Worrying helps me to avoid disastrous situations. 
23. I am constantly aware of my thinking. 
24. I have a poor memory. 
25. I pay close attention to the way my mind works. 
26. People who do not worry have no depth. 
27 . Worrying helps me cope. 
28. I imagine having not done things, and then doubt my memory for doing them. 
29. Not being able to control my thoughts is a sign of weakness. 
30. If I did not worry, I would make more mistakes. 
31. I find it difficult to control my thoughts. 
32. Worrying is a sign of a good person. 
33. Worrying thoughts enter my head against my will. 
34. If I could not control my thoughts I would go crazy. 
35. I will lose out in life if! do not worry. 
36. When I start worrying, I cannot stop. 
37. Some thoughts will always need to be controlled. 
38. I need to worry in order to get things done. 
39. I could be punished for not having certain thoughts. 
40. My thoughts interfere with my concentration. 
41. I it alright to let my thoughts roam free. 
42. I worry about my thoughts. 
43. I am easily distracted. 
44. My worrying thoughts are not productive. 
45. Worrying can stop me from seeing a situation clearly. 
46. Worrying helps me to solve problems. 
47. I have little confidence in my memory for places. 
48. My worrying thoughts are uncontrollable. 
49. It is bad to think certain thoughts. 
50. If I do not control my thoughts, I may end up embarrassing myself. 
51. I do not trust my memory. 
52. I do my clearest thinking when I am worrying. 
53. My worrying thoughts appear automatically. 
54. I would be selfish if I never worried. 
55. If I could not control my thoughts, I would not be able to function. 
56. I need to worry in order to work well. 











58. I have difficulty keeping my mind focused on one thing for a long time. 
59. If a bad thing happens which I have not worried about, I feel responsible. 
60. It would not be normal if I did not worry. 
62. If I stopped worrying, I would become glib, arrogant, and offensive. 
63. Worrying helps me to plan the future more effectively. 
64. I would be a stronger person if I could worry less. 











APPENDIX B: The Padua Inventory (PI) 
Instructions: 
The following statements refer to thoughts and behaviours which may occur to everyone in everyday life. 
For each statement, choose the reply that best seems to fit you and the degree of disturbance which such 
thoughts or behaviours may create. Rate your replies as follows: 
0- not at all 
I - a little 
2 - quite a lot 
3 - a lot 
4 - very much 
I. I feel my hands are dirty when I touch money. 
2. I think even slight contact with bodily secretion (perspiration, saliva, urine. etc.) may contaminate my 
clothes or somehow harm me. 
3. I find it difficult to touch an object when I know it has been touched by strangers or by certain people. 
4. I find it difficult to touch garbage or dirty things. 
5. I avoid using public toilets because I am afraid of disease and contamination. 
6. I avoid using public telephones because I am afraid of contagion and disease. 
7. I wash my hands more often and longer than necessary. 
8. I sometimes have to wash or clean myself simply because I think I may be dirty or 'contaminated'. 
9. If I touch something I think is 'contaminated', I immediately have to wash or clean myself. 
10. If an animal touches me, I feel dirty and immediately have to wash myself or change my clothing. 
II. When doubts or worries come into my mind, I cannot rest until I have talked them over with a 
reassuring person. 
12. When I talk, I tend to repeat the same things and the same sentences several times. 
13. I tend to ask people to repeat the same things to me several times consecutively, even though I did 
understand what they said the first time. 
14. I feel obliged to follow a particular order in dressing, undressing and washing myself. 
15. Before going to sleep, I have to do certain things in a certain order. 
16. Before going to bed, I have to hang up or fold my clothes in a special way. 
17. I feel I have to repeat certain numbers for no reason. 
18. I have to do things several times before I think they are properly done. 
19. I tend to keep on checking things more often than necessary. 
20. I check and recheck gas and water taps and light switches after turning them off. 











22. I keep on checking forms, documents, cheques, etc., in detail, to make sure I have filled them in 
correctly. 
23. I keep on going back to see that matches, cigarettes, etc., are properly extinguished. 
24. When I handle money I count and recount it several times. 
25. I check letters carefully many times before posting them. 
26. I find it difficult to take decisions, even about unimportant matters. 
27. Sometimes I am not sure I have done things which in fact I know I have done. 
28. I have the impression that I will never be able to explain things clearly, especially when talking about 
important matters that involve me. 
29. After doing something carefully, I still have the impression I have either done it badly or not finished it. 
30. I am sometimes late because I keep on doing certain things more often than necessary. 
31. I invent doubts and problems about most of the things I do. 
32. When I start thinking of certain things, I become obsessed with them. 
33. Unpleasant thoughts come into my mind against my will and I cannot get rid of them. 
34. Obscene or dirty words come into my mind and I cannot get rid of them. 
35. My brain constantly goes its own way and I find it difficult to attend to what is happening around me. 
36. I imagine catastrophic consequences as a result of absent-mindedness or minor errors which I make. 
37. I think or worry at length about having hurt someone without knowing it. 
38. When I think about a disaster, I think it is somehow my fault. 
39. I sometimes worry at length for no reason that I have hurt myself or have some disease. 
40. I sometimes start counting objects for no reason. 
41. I feel I have to remember completely unimportant numbers. 
42. When I read I have the impression I have missed something important and must go back and reread the 
passage at least two or three times. 
43. I worry about remembering completely unimportant things and make an effort not to forget them. 
44. When a thought or doubt comes into my mind, I have to examine it from all points of view and cannot 
stop until I have done so. 
45. In certain situations I am afraid of losing my self-control and doing embarrassing things. 
46. When I look down from a bridge or a very high window, I feel an impulse to throw myself into space. 
47. When I see a train approaching I sometimes think I could throw myself under the wheels. 
48. At certain moments, I am tempted to tear off my clothes in public. 
49. While driving I sometimes feel an impulse to drive the car into someone or something. 
50. Seeing weapons excites me and makes me think violent thoughts. 
51. I get upset and worried at the sight of knives, daggers and other pointed objects. 
52. I sometimes feel something inside me which makes me do things which are really senseless and which I 
do not want to do. 











54. I sometimes have an impulse to steal other people's belongings, even if they are of no use to me. 
55. I am sometimes almost irresistibly tempted to steal something from the supermarket. 
56. I sometimes have an impulse to hurt defenceless children or animals. 
57. I feel I have to make special gestures or walk in a certain way. 
58. In certain situations I feel an impulse to eat too much, even if I am then ill. 
59. When I hear about a suicide or a crime, I am upset for a long time and find it difficult to stop worrying 
about it. 
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APPENDIX D: Participant recruitment email 
Initial emails: 
Subject: Want to win Rl OOO?! 
To stand a chance of winning Rl 000*, go to the web site below and fill in two 
questionnaires as part of a Psychology Masters research project. It should only take you 
about 15 minutes. They must be filled in during the next 2 weeks (by 3rd October 2005). 
If yours is the lucky name drawn, you will be contacted either by phone or by email, to 
arrange transfer of funds ... Good luck! 
Web site: http://psyassign.psy.uct.ac.zafMichelle/Survey.htm 
'Raffle prize drawn from Masters degree funding (dissertation completed in partial fulfilment of degree). 
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